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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONGO, 1960-1965:
CONTAINMENT, MINERALS AND STRATEGIC LOCATION

The Congo Crisis of the early 1960s served as a satellite conflict between the
United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Scholars have argued about
U.S. motivations and interests involved in the Congo Crisis. The major division between
scholars is between those who contend the United States acted for national security
reasons and those scholars who argue the United States desired to establish a neocolonial
regime to protect economic interests pertaining to vast Congolese mineral wealth. The
argument of this thesis is that the United States policy in the Congo between 1960 and
1965 focused on installing a friendly regime in the Congo in order to protect its national
security interests. This argument lends to the introduction of a new term to classify U.S.
actions: pseudocolonialism. The previous term, neocolonialism, denotes a negative
connotation based on economic greed and does not satisfactorily explain the motivations
of the United States. By examining the value to the United States of Congolese uranium
and cobalt as well as Congolese geographic location, the singular explanation of
economic greed is weakened.
KEYWORDS: American Foreign Policy, Cold War Conflicts, Pseudocolonialism,
Strategic Minerals, National Security
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Chapter One: Congolese Independence and Crisis
Between 1975 and 1976, the United States Senate convened a special committee
to investigate the intelligence operations of the nation. 1 The Senators, led by Frank
Church of Idaho, conducted their hearings with the intent of improving understanding of
the lengths to which the American intelligence community had gone in their operations
against the Soviet Union and communism. The committee, popularly referred to as the
“Church Committee” after its chairman, revealed two assassination operations and three
coup operations focused on Third World leaders who American administrations deemed
threatening to the interests of the United States.
Patrice Lumumba joined Fidel Castro as the only two world leaders whose death
the United States actively pursued. What was so important about the Congo and Patrice
Lumumba that led the United States to believe internal Congolese affairs affected U.S.
interests? Lumumba became the Premier of the Congo upon its independence from
Belgium on June 30, 1960. During the independence ceremony, he delivered an
unplanned speech that riled the Belgian government and inspired the Congolese people.
The speech provoked the suspicions of the Eisenhower administration that Lumumba was
a devout nationalist unafraid of western powers and capable of stirring up emotional
reaction from the Congolese with eloquent speeches and rhetoric. Within days of
independence, the Congolese army mutinied but Lumumba was able to calm the situation
and return to a level of normalcy by discussing the army’s complaints with soldiers in
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The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the
United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session. This committee was a result of Senate
Resolution 21.
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person. 2 Lumumba’s ability to convince others to follow his path contributed to
American perceptions of his leadership as a threat to U.S. interests. Prominent leaders of
the Eisenhower administration had differing opinions of Lumumba’s political orientation.
Secretary of State Dulles believed Lumumba was a communist, Ambassador to the U.N.
Lodge disagreed with Dulles but declared Lumumba as “not crazy” and alluded to his
deliberate plans and actions. U.S. Ambassador to the Congo Robinson McIlvaine
believed Lumumba was no communist but labeled him an opportunist; this label denoted
something worse than communist in the eyes of the Eisenhower administration. The
inability to fully understand Lumumba’s political orientation added to the Eisenhower
administration’s concerns for the orientation of the nascent Congo in the polarized Cold
War.
Turmoil ensued following the mutiny of the army in the Congo. The United
States was drawn into the conflict both directly and through the United Nations and
continued to play a role in the country until the crisis subsided well into the 1960s.
During this time, the United States was implicated in the death of Patrice Lumumba,
complicit at times in the secession of Katanga as well as being directly involved in the
encouragement of Mobutu’s coups that ultimately installed him as the dictator for nearly
thirty years. The Congo Crisis quickly became an intricate and demanding problem for
U.S. leaders and policymakers. Khrushchev stirred divisions at the United Nations and
used his criticism of U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold’s handling of the crisis
2

The Congolese Army at the time of independence was still named the Force Publique. White Belgian
officers led black soldiers. After independence the commander of the Force Publique was explaining the
political situation to his soldiers and wrote on a chalkboard that “Before independence=After
Independence.” This statement was construed by the soldiers to be the maintenance of their status quo;
they soon mutinied and violence broke out against Europeans in the Congo. Lumumba went to the nearest
installation and quelled the mutiny by promoting everyone by one pay grade and changing the force’s name
to the Congolese National Army.
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to call for the restructuring of the executive element of the United Nations. For better or
worse, the global Cold War battle between the United States and the Soviet Union played
out in the Congo.
U.S. actions in the crisis attracted great criticism from multiple factions and other
nations. American leaders acted to secure American interests in the Congo during the
crisis. But what was the nature of these interests? Did American national security drive
the actions of the American government in the Congo Crisis or was it the desire of the
United States to establish a neocolonial regime to allow American corporations to exploit
Congolese mineral wealth? These questions have structured the historiographical debate
on American actions in the Congo Crisis. These questions are important, but a greater
understanding of the contemporary situation is necessary in order to seek their answers.
This paper will examine these questions and demonstrate how the events of the Congo
Crisis allow the addition of a new argument, pseudocolonialism, to this debate.
Pseudocolonialism is the system by which one nation controls another in order to protect
or preserve its own national security interests. National security interests within the
Congo motivated the U.S. desire to establish a controlling influence in the Congo.
Various interests provided the Congo such importance to the United States will be
examined: the continuous crises of containment in Eisenhower’s second term; the role
strategic minerals played in policy decisions regarding the Congo and Africa south of the
Sahara as well as geostrategic implications of the Congo’s location on the continent of
Africa. Once analyzed, these factors assist placing U.S. actions in the Congo into proper
context.

3

Several factors can be found in the historical documents that suggest the reasons
for deep U.S. involvement in the affairs of an unfamiliar section of African territory.
First, as a newly formed nation in the Cold War battleground of the Third World, the
Congo represented a target for influence to both the United States and the Soviet Union.
Both superpowers maneuvered and jockeyed for favorable position within the nation and
in the United Nations in order to have one more nation join their side of the Cold War.
U.S. leaders were well versed with the concepts in NSC-68 that were represented by the
domino theory. The loss of any nation to communism was seen as a strategic victory for
the Soviets and the Congo bordered nine newly independent nations that were susceptible
to the spread of communism. Secondly, of all the new nations formed in 1960 from
former European colonies, the Congo stood out due to its mineral wealth. At the time of
independence, the Congo possessed the largest reserve of uranium on Earth; this uranium
was found in the copper belt of southern Congo along with inordinate amounts of copper,
tin and cobalt. 3 The United States produced most of its copper requirements domestically
and imported the majority of its tin from Malaysia and Singapore but it needed foreign
cobalt. The United States valued Congolese uranium for its unmatched purity in the
1950s and imported more than 80% of its cobalt from the Congolese copper belt in
1959. 4 Finally, the Congo gained its independence at a time when Cold War tensions had
been increased due to major strategic threats to the United States. As both sides planned
3

Jonathan E. Helmreich, United States Relations with Belgium and the Congo, 1940-1960 (Newark:
University of Delaware Press, 1998): 16.
4
U.S. Geological Survey, 2012, Copper statistics, in Kelly, T.D., and Matos, G.R., comps., Historical
statistics for mineral and material commodities in the United States: U.S. Geological Survey Data Series
140, accessed [February 11, 2013], at http://pubs.usgs.gov/ds/2005/140/; John E. Shelton and John B.
Umhau, “Tin,” (Table 12- U.S. Imports for consumption of tin, by countries), Bureau of Mines Minerals
Yearbook: Metals and Minerals (except Fuels), 1960 vol. I (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1961): 1107; Tom
Zoellner, Uranium: War, Energy, and the Rock that Shaped the World (New York: Penguin, 2009): 289;
Joseph H. Bilbrey and Dorothy T. McDougal, “Cobalt,” Bureau of Mines Minerals Yearbook: Metals and
Minerals (except Fuels), 1955, vol. I (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1960): 366.
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for a possible World War III (WWIII), international diplomacy and logistical planning
took into consideration many obscure nations and areas that were otherwise deemed
unimportant. The Congo lay in the middle of Africa and could provide the United States
with transit points to move their air and ground forces through to the battlegrounds of the
Middle East.
Through examination of the primary documents surrounding these factors and
events, this paper will attempt to discern the contribution of each of these factors in
constructing the value of the Congo within U.S. policy. U.S. leaders at the time viewed
the world through the lens of the domino theory and NSC-68. The loss of the Congo to
communism threatened the United States in its zero sum game of containment. Its loss
would also prevent U.S. access to Congolese minerals and infrastructure. Individuals can
write memoirs and autobiographies with a mind toward history; they may attempt to
skew the future readers’ opinions of their actions into a positive light. Communication
between leaders and decision makers presents a similar problem to history; there can be
language redacted, or verbal communication that is left unrecorded. Additionally, the
only communication that can be interpreted is that which has been released or found.
Despite these drawbacks, analysis of memoirs and correspondence of U.S. leaders
demonstrates their concerns about the spread of communism into the Congo.
To understand the role some minerals played in the formation and execution of
American policy during the Congo Crisis, the two Congolese minerals most important to
the United States will be examined. Diplomatic cables and agreements as well as
domestic statutes indicate the value of uranium to the national security of the United
States. Uranium was interwoven into relations between the United States, Belgium and

5

the Congo at a time when the nuclear arms race was at near-peak tempo; the history of
this mineral and these nations is the story of some of the Congo’s greatest wealth
potential. Likewise, cobalt plays an integral role in American policy toward the Congo.
While not as dangerous outright as its radioactive partner, cobalt is almost as strategically
valuable to the United States and cannot be discounted in the formation of policy. Study
of government records and almanacs provide only quantitative data about these minerals.
However, these sources allow for a starting point to determine the value of minerals to
U.S. national security; the amounts of uranium and cobalt required by the United States
during this period reveal the significance of the Congo as an American source for both
minerals.
The intangible elements of influence and quantifiable features of strategic
minerals are important, but so too are the fundamentals of location. Where the Congo lay
on the Earth during the height of the Cold War helped determine the level of attention it
received from both superpowers. Its centrality, both physical and political, to the
continent of Africa is unmistakable. Diplomatic exchanges, minutes of policy meetings
and communications expose the reasons why Africa in general and the Congo in
particular played such an essential role in formulation of defensive planning for WWIII.
The following chapters will utilize these primary sources to examine the value of
the Congo to U.S. national security. The second Eisenhower administration consisted of a
series of international crises that threatened U.S. prestige and position as it attempted to
contain the spread of communism in the Cold War. The situation in the Congo at the
time of its independence presented a crisis to the United States because the Congo lay at
the heart of the continent of Africa. A communist Congo could be the perpetrator of the
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African domino theory because it bordered nine other decolonizing nations. Congolese
possession of the strategic mineral ores of uranium and cobalt were needed by the United
States to defeat the Soviet Union in the nuclear arms and space races. Ultimately if the
Cold War turned into a conventional worldwide conflict, the Congo’s position on the
globe would be crucial to the U.S. ability to project military power into the Middle East
and Asia. Where all of these factors intertwine lays U.S. policy toward the Congo. U.S.
actions to establish pseudocolonial control in the Congo can be understood in the context
of the superpower fight for influence, strategic mineral acquisitions and geostrategic
factors. These elements assist in a clearer understanding of U.S. policies and decisions.
A nation’s strategic security interests are usually central to its foreign policy; if not, the
leaders are derelict in their duty as the stewards of their nations.
The Congo Crisis and Historiography
The Congo Crisis is the story of international intrigue at the height of the Cold
War. A country in the middle of central Africa became the focal point of diplomatic
energy, money and military effort of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United
Nations and many other nations during the early 1960s. The years between the end of
WWII and the Congo Crisis represent a relatively stable period in the Belgian Congo as
well as in relations between the United States and Belgium. The Congo was born an
independent nation in 1960 when Belgium relinquished its control of its premier colony.
Commonly referred to as the “African Year of Independence,” 1960 witnessed the birth
of seventeen new African nations as the process of decolonization reached its apogee.
The British and French began African decolonization after it was forced upon them as a
result of previous violent struggles in their empires. The Belgian government did not
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share this experience of violent struggle in the Belgian Congo and therefore was able to
ignore calls for independence for a much longer time. Belgian belief that colonial control
would last for decades made changes to their system unreal; it was only after popular
uprisings in the last years of the 1950s that Belgian resolve was shaken. The Belgian
departure was never planned as thoroughly as some other metropolitan powers’
departures; the result was an abrupt and unorganized retreat that sowed the seeds of
future political conflict.
Many scholars and journalists have explored the events and causes of the Congo
Crisis of the early 1960s. The reasons and motivations assigned to the United States by
these authors cover a wide expanse. Some offer explanations based on national security
interests: the United States acted in the Congo to contain communism from spreading to
another Third World country after the disaster of Castro’s takeover in Cuba. Others offer
more sinister and diabolical reasons: the United States acted to replace Belgium as the
Congo’s neocolonial master with the intention of profiting from Congolese mineral
wealth.
Scholars propose many reasons for why the U.S. involved itself so deeply with
the Congo. National security concerns play a central role in the historiography of the
topic. Among others, Madeleine Kalb, Lawrence Kaplan and David Dickson have
claimed that U.S. actions were based on the need to maintain stability in order to stem
Soviet expansion.5 The necessity of preventing Soviet intervention is also accepted by
Stephen R. Weissman, but he contends the United States misperceived the Soviet threat
5 Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa-From Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York:
Macmillan, 1982); Lawrence Kaplan, “The United States, Belgium, and the Congo Crisis of 1960,” The
Review of Politics 29 (Apr 1967): 239-256.; David Dickson, “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Southern and
Central Africa: The Kennedy and Johnson Years, “ Political Science Quarterly 23, no. 2 (Spring 1993):
301-315.
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to the Congo and thus their actions were misplaced and unnecessary. 6 While these views
of national security as the motivation behind U.S. actions are generally understanding of
the United States; much more critical interpretations exist.
One such interpretation, neocolonialism, is based on economic motivations
surrounding copper and minerals; David Gibbs argues that tensions increased between
Belgium and the United States because the latter wanted to replace the Belgian mining
company of Union Miniere with an American company. Gibbs is joined by work from
Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, a Congolese-born political scientist, who agrees the United
States was motivated by a quest to institute neocolonialism in the Congo. In his work
about the death of Lumumba, Ludo de Witte outlines his case that Belgium was
attempting to kill Congolese nationalism in order to establish a neocolonial regime
controlled by Brussels. In the literature both the United States and Belgium share blame
for neocolonial intentions, but these intentions are always motivated by profits from
Congolese mineral wealth. 7 These scholars ignore the profit component of the western
capitalist system. If a western government instituted neocolonial control for national
security reasons, its corporations would still gain profits from their investments in the
industries of the controlled nation. The existence of corporate profits does not
automatically define the motivation for western nations’ actions.

6

Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1974) and “CIA Covert Action in Zaire and Angola: Patterns and Consequences,” Political Science
Quarterly 94 (Summer 1979): 263-286.
7 David N. Gibbs, “International Commercial Rivalries and the Zairean Copper Nationalisation of 1967,”
Review of African Political Economy 24 (June 1997): 171-184; David N. Gibbs, The Political Economy of
Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1991); Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History
(London: Zed Books, 2002); Ludo de Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba, translated by Ann Wright and
Renee Fenby (London, Verso, 2001).
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Minerals play an integral role in other scholars’ views on the topic. While
Weissman agrees with aspects of the mineral motivation, he does not include the full
spectrum of the Congolese mineral wealth. Thomas Borstelmann briefly explains how
uranium was one of the most important Congolese minerals concerning U.S. interests in
his book about U.S. motivations in its relations with the racist South African regime
during the Cold War. 8 Borstelmann argues that uranium was so essential to the foreign
policy of the United States that it drove the United States to acquiesce to South Africa’s
apartheid policies in order to secure a reliable and stable source of the mineral.
Borstelmann’s argument in relation to South Africa explains unattractive U.S.
actions that were driven by its national security interests. A similar argument for U.S.
actions and motivations in the Congo will be advanced in this paper to expand
Borstelmann’s argument to Congolese uranium and cobalt. The value of Congolese
minerals to U.S. national security will support the expanded argument. Congolese
minerals, along with its geostrategic location and the need to contain communism
justified U.S. actions taken to establish pseudocolonial control in the Congo.
The historiography of U.S. involvement in the Congo Crisis of the early 1960s is
focused largely on the questions surrounding motivation. This scholarly debate is
essentially between two motivations: national security and neocolonialism. The national
security school is normally softer in their criticism of the United States while the
neocolonialism school tends to be critical and unsympathetic of U.S. action in the Congo
Crisis.

8

Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early
Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

10

Scholars who believe the United States acted out of concern for their national
security usually deliver accounts of U.S. actions that are more sympathetic to the United
States than others. These authors are able to view U.S. actions in a softer light because of
their consideration of multiple factors in the examination of American motivations. The
predominant consideration of these scholars surrounds the American strategy of
containment. They review American actions with the knowledge that the United States
feared the loss of any nation to the influence of Soviet communism. Containment of
communism motivated a variety of U.S. actions within this period and it is definitely
present in U.S. actions throughout the Congo Crisis.
National security as a term is difficult to define clearly. It appeared in the U.S.
lexicon sometime during WWII and became an established term in national discourse
after Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947. However, even in this legislation
that introduced mainstream Americans to the term it is not defined. This increases the
ambiguity of the term especially when used in scholarly debate. For the purposes of this
paper, the term national security will follow that which is set by the U.S. defense
establishment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff defined the term “national security interests” in
2010 as:
“…the foundation for the development of valid national objectives that
define US goals or purposes. National security interests include preserving
US political identity, framework, and institutions; fostering economic
well-being; and bolstering international order supporting the vital interests
of the United States and its allies” 9
Even this definition leaves room for maneuver for anyone seeking to use it to
support or oppose decisions or actions. Scholars of the national security school
9

U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff, “Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms,” 8 November 2010 (As Amended Through 15 November 2012)
(Washington D.C.: GPO, 2012): 214.
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would defend U.S. actions in the Congo Crisis because they were justified by the
threat of Soviet communism.
Containment of communism is possibly too narrow of a view of U.S.
involvement in the Congo Crisis. If containment motivated U.S. actions in the
Congo Crisis, it was not solely for containment’s sake. Granted the U.S. desire
was to prevent any nation being won over by the Soviet Union and communism
but the Congo possessed elements, in the way of minerals and location, that
required stronger actions to be contemplated. Consideration of these elements
support the argument that U.S. actions were congruent with national security
interests but simply arguing containment for containment’s sake results in loss of
scholarly ground to the neocolonialist school.
Scholars who support the contention that U.S. actions were motivated by
neocolonialist intentions usually dismiss the threat of expanding communism as a
tool used by the United States and the West to cover their capitalist objectives to
secure economic favor or dominance with regard to Congolese minerals.
Economic motivation is the key difference that separates the two schools. It is
also the factor that provides such a negative connotation to the term
neocolonialism; control exerted over other nations for the purposes of increasing
profit margins is difficult to justify.
Definition of neocolonialism is almost as problematic as defining national
security. Concerning U.S. actions in the Congo Crisis, the term is associated with
an unsympathetic view of the U.S. role. The origination of the term
neocolonialism is credited to Ghana’s first President, Kwame Nkrumah.

12

Nkrumah defined the term in his 1965 book, Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of
Imperialism, in part by describing its essence. He says the state that is subject to
neocolonialism is in theory independent and has all the outward trappings of
international sovereignty but in reality its economic system and thus its political
policy is directed from outside. 10 To Nkrumah the most important component of
neocolonialism is economic control. He continues in his general description of
neocolonialism in the next five pages of his introduction. Some elements of
outside control apply to U.S. actions; U.S. support and assistance to Mobutu’s rise
to power reflects the neocolonial “provision of civil servants in positions where
they can dictate policy.” 11 Further explanation by Nkrumah details the economic
components of neocolonialism; however, most of these components do not fit
with U.S. actions during the Congo Crisis.
In the case of U.S. involvement in the Congo Crisis, neither national
security nor neocolonialism is a fitting term to describe U.S. actions or intentions.
Elements of both terms can be extracted from the documents and primary sources
surrounding the Congo Crisis. Throughout this material there is sufficient
discussion of the threat of expanding communism and Soviet influence in the
Congo. There are also discussions concerning economics and trade. However,
there is also ample material to support a combination of the national security and
neocolonialism arguments to explain American actions in the Congo Crisis. This
combination is the argument made in the current examination: the need to contain
communism, control access to strategic minerals and protect lines of
10

Kwame Nkrumah, Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons,
Ltd., 1965): ix.
11
Ibid., x.
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communication motivated the United States to emplace a pseudocolonial
government in the Congo. Pseudocolonialism in the Congo allowed the United
States to protect or preserve its national security interests in the Congo.
The Congo from Leopold to Mobutu
Colonialism in the Congo began almost eighty years prior to the Crisis; the
Belgian Congo was born into the nascent world of colonized Africa in 1884 as the Congo
Free State. 12 At the Berlin Conference of 1884, fourteen European nations negotiated
agreements to outline their conduct toward one another as they grabbed land and colonies
in Africa. King Leopold II of Belgium gained the land that would become the Congo
Free State through a series of negotiations and agreements. An enormous difference for
the colony was the method of control; Leopold ruled it as his own property and not as an
administrated colony. The Belgian people and government were not interested in empire
so Leopold II organized the International African Association. This organization
espoused a mission to civilize the Congo; in actuality its goal was to plunder the wealth
through cheap, forced labor of the natives.
The Congo would become a major producer of high-value minerals but at the turn
of the twentieth century rubber became a booming business and Leopold II seized on the
opportunity. In the Congo Free State, Leopold II’s administrators ran a brutal system of
forced labor to maximize the rubber output of the colony. Through violent domination,
the Belgians abused the Congolese native people in order to achieve greater economic
success. The brutality progressed to such a level that Leopold II was ultimately forced by

12

For general background and understanding of Congolese history and the Congo Crisis, see: Jonathan E.
Helmreich, United States Relations with Belgium and the Congo, 1940-1960 (Newark: University of
Delaware Press, 1998); Helen Kitchen, ed., Footnotes to the Congo Story: An Africa Report Anthology
(New York: Walker and Company, 1967) and Kalb, Congo Cables.
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the Belgian government to turn over control of the Congo Free State in 1908. This
transition marked the creation of the Belgian Congo as an official colony of the Belgian
nation, a relationship that lasted until independence in 1960.
Development of the natural resources continued in the Belgian Congo under the
control of the Belgian state. During and after World War One (WWI), mineral
exploration led to the dominance of the industry in the colony. The Belgian Congo
became a leading producer of diamonds, copper and cobalt and to lesser degrees
tungsten, radium and other assorted minerals. The Manhattan Project in WWII and the
U.S. quest for atomic weaponry during its arms race with the Soviet Union in the early
1950s provided the catalyst for the Belgian Congo to become the world’s premier
producer of uranium. It held this position until the late 1950s and ended with Congolese
independence in 1960.
The end of WWII and the formation of the United Nations marked the beginnings
of the final period of Belgian control of the Congo. Within the charter of the United
Nations existed the declaration of self-determination for all people. This had been a
motive of Woodrow Wilson when he advocated for the League of Nations; however, he
was subdued by the European powers at the end of WWI because of their quest for power
and economic gain. The United Nations was a reincarnation of the League of Nations
and provided smaller nations the opportunity to vie for self-determination and gain
support of other nations in a pseudo-binding manner. At the end of WWII, the British,
French and Dutch attempted to ignore self-determination in their empires; however,
violent conflicts in their colonies eventually forced them to grant independence to the
colonies under their control. The Belgians at the time possessed a cash cow with mineral
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wealth and had no intentions to lose this advantage. It was in the postwar period that
Congolese cobalt began rising in prominence as steel production increased with the
beginning of the Cold War. They deferred calls by the United States and other nations to
grant the Congolese their independence.
The ascension of a new king in Belgium, King Baudouin, brought a renewed
focus of the Belgian government onto the affairs of the Congolese people. Baudouin
altered the previous Belgian course of ignoring the Congolese calls for independence.
The world was progressing beyond colonialism; Baudouin realized this and satiated the
Congolese calls with a plan to grant independence after a thirty year transitional period
designed to prepare the Congolese for sovereignty. 13
A change in parliamentary leadership in Belgium in July 1958 served as a catalyst
to reduce the timeframe for independence for the Belgian Congo. Indications of
Congolese resentment made the United States aware that the independence movement
was proceeding at an increasingly rapid pace. 14 The new Belgian government
constructed a program for Congolese autonomy but it was delayed because of political
wrangling. The delay hurt the Belgian position and in January 1959 the Congolese
tension exploded in two days of rioting. Responding within days, the Belgian king
announced that the Belgian government’s goal was now to deliberately and orderly grant
independence. 15
At the Brussels Roundtable in January 1960, Belgian authorities met with
Congolese leadership to discuss plan for independence. The Belgians offered a four-year
timeline that was rejected; after negotiations, independence was slated for June 30, 1960.
13
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The six-month period from Baudouin’s announcement of independence to actual
independence marked a departure from the Belgian’s hopeful plans of deliberate
transition. The hastiness of the Belgian withdrawal demonstrated that the king and his
subjects were tired of dealing with the Congolese and all the accompanying trouble.
Once the native African population was aroused to the idea of independence, the Belgians
determined that “control of an area seventy seven times larger than Belgium would be
impossible to maintain…the Belgian Government sensibly decided to yield more selfrule.” 16 The hastiness of the departure and the weariness of the Belgian people
contributed to an irresponsible handover that contributed significantly to the subsequent
crisis.
As Congolese political leadership began to take shape over the next few months,
the United States met with those they saw as powerful within the various parties and
movements that would vie for control of the new country’s government. As the new
government attempted to define itself, the fractiousness of the indigenous population
created an impending political storm causing the Belgians to seal the uranium mine at
Shinkolobwe in April 1960. Patrice Lumumba was selected as the nation’s first prime
minister and issued a scathing address at the independence ceremony on June 30, 1960.
Days after the Congo formally became independent events transpired that spun
the nation and the rest of the world into crisis. Commonly referred to as the Congo
Crisis, this period consisted of one emergency situation after another for almost three
years. Domestically the Congo faced army mutinies, political and tribal maneuvering,
secessions and constitutional dilemmas. Internationally, the world’s two superpowers,
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the United Nations and the previously liberated African nations played significant roles in
Congolese affairs. For the first half of the 1960s, events in the previously obscure center
of Africa weighed heavy on the minds of world leaders.
Within days of independence the mineral rich province of Katanga seceded from
the Congo under guidance and protection of the Belgian mining company Union Miniere.
Unrest continued unabated despite actions taken by the United States, the Soviet Union
and the United Nations to restore stability. In September 1960, Lumumba was deposed
and arrested; by January 1961 he was dead. A series of governments replaced one
another in the Congo until the Congolese Army Chief of Staff, Joseph Mobutu, seized
power at the end of 1965 and restored a level of stability to the Congo.
The crisis embroiled the diplomats and leaders of the world’s nations on a neardaily basis for more than three years. Tensions between the United States and the Soviet
Union increased, the United Nations suffered attacks on its organizational structure by
the Communist bloc and the Congolese suffered brutality after brutality for the duration
of the period of instability. Upon first glance, this episode in the history of the Cold War
seems odd. Why would the Congo play such a critical role in worldwide disputes at the
heart of the Cold War struggle between communism and the free world? Why did the
world care about Patrice Lumumba, Joseph Kasavubu and Joseph Mobutu? These
questions and many others are the focus of this paper. The international backwaters of
the Congo were important to the stability of the world during the course of the Cold War
because of the state of the late-fifties Cold War, its mineral wealth and its location in the
event of WWIII. All of these factors will be explored in the following chapters to
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demonstrate how the United States was justified in its actions to establish a
pseudocolonial regime in the Congo in order to guarantee U.S. national security interests.

19

Chapter Two: Influence as a Strategic Objective
From the start of the Cold War, the United States was faced with the challenge of
containing communism. As new leaders came to power around the world in the early
years of the Cold War, the United States attempted to determine with whom they would
align. Complicating this determination was the process of decolonization taking place in
much of the Third World. Quite often, as colonial powers granted the indigenous
population their freedom, nationalist leaders would assume power. If the new nationalist
leader espoused strong independence from the Western powers or made any moves that
suggested leftward leanings, such as nationalization of industries, the West would label
him as a communist and deal with him accordingly. Political unrest led to instability;
instability gave the Soviets an opportunity for influence. Containment meant stopping
the spread of Soviet influence; therefore, the United States had a vested interest in who
led the nations of the Third World. This interest was present in the Congo; U.S. interest
in prevention of communism expansion into the Congo justified U.S. pseudocolonial
actions there.
From the end of WWII, the United States and its allies watched the Soviet Union
support the spread of communism across the world. Eastern Europe was subjected to
communism quickly because of its proximity to the Soviet Union that, at a minimum, was
eager to secure a buffer zone on its borders to prevent future aggression. Communist
attempts to take over the government of Greece served as the impetus for the U.S.
formulation of its post-war anti-communism policies. 17 China fell to communism and
Korea was under attack soon afterwards. Threats of communist subversion prompted
17
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U.S. actions during the 1950s against Iran, Guatemala and other nations. Communism
and threats of its spread moved from Asia to the western hemisphere during the 1950s
and finally presented itself in Africa as European powers began to liquidate their colonial
holdings.
As Eisenhower began his second term in office, he was already experienced
dealing with international crises as the President. In his first four years in the White
House, the Korean War ended, Stalin died, the Chinese communists and nationalists
fought over islands that lay between them, Arab Nationalism rose with Egypt and the
relationship with two of the nation’s strongest allies, France and Great Britain, were
strained in the wake of the Suez Crisis of 1956. This level of crisis in the world
demonstrates the building tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union as
they attempted to maintain security and increase influence while avoiding nuclear war.
Eisenhower’s second term was filled with near-constant international crisis for the
United States that affected how Eisenhower approached the Congo Crisis. It could be
argued that because of his success in WWII, President Eisenhower was one of the most
prepared Presidents ever to deal with crisis management and problem solving. However,
the number and intensity of problems to resolve increased during the last few years that
he occupied the White House. To understand why Eisenhower would take such a strong
position in the Congo Crisis in the last months of his presidency, it is necessary to view
this effort in the context of the Cold War as it was occurring at the time. Brief discussion
of the events of his second term will demonstrate the tempo and intensity with which
crises were presented to the American leader. From both domestic and foreign policy
issues, the United States was faced with a nearly unending series of crises in the last few
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months of Eisenhower’s presidency. In each of these instances, Eisenhower had to
determine and execute the proper course of action to retain or recover U.S. prestige and
influence in the world. Protecting the prestige on the United States was a vital interest in
the U.S. quest to influence other nations and prevent the spread of communism.
Independence Struggle and Cold War Crisis
Significant international and domestic crises became the focus of the
administration for days and weeks at a time. These acute crises increased Cold War
tension and influenced world opinion. But how did this heating of tensions, both foreign
and domestic, relate to the newly born Congo in the middle of Africa? In this period of
increased crisis and tension in the Cold War, the emerging nation of the Congo was faced
with enormous decisions. The status of the Cold War at the time of Congolese
independence was such that no nation could pursue its own interests without declaring
some alignment in the struggle between the superpowers. The options available to the
Congolese government were only three: align with the West, align with the Soviets or
join the Non-Aligned Movement. Benefits could be gained by pursuit of any of these
avenues but not without contention from the parties not chosen. Additionally, the
Congolese choice was seen as having enormous consequences on the balance of power in
the world through the institution of the United Nations.
Brief examination of the crises of his second term will assist in understanding the
intensity of the international situation faced by President Eisenhower when the Congo
Crisis erupted. These international crises will be juxtaposed with events of the
independence struggle in the Belgian Congo. The overlay of Congolese events will
demonstrate how the United States was unprepared when faced with Congolese
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independence and the subsequent conflict of the Congo Crisis. U.S. attention was
diverted elsewhere during the late 1950s while Congolese tension was rapidly increasing.
By the time the crisis erupted in the Congo in June 1960, near-constant international
crises had already strained Eisenhower’s willingness to apply patience in resolving
Congolese issues. These crises increased Eisenhower’s willingness to prevent the spread
of communism through installation of a pseudocolonial regime in the Congo.
Joseph Kasavubu was already a leading nationalist figure in the Belgian Congo as
the leader of the major political party ABAKO by the start of Eisenhower’s second term.
The Belgians had granted some political rights to the urban elite of the African
population who they termed “evolues.” 18 In August 1956, ABAKO rejected a thirty-year
plan for independence that had been presented earlier in the year by a Belgian academic.
In ABAKO’s August denunciation of this plan, Kasavubu had publicly called for
immediate independence from the Belgians. 19
Meanwhile, in the United States, African-Americans were fighting for their own
rights in the Civil Rights Movement. Anticolonialist lobbies in the United States,
nationalists fighting colonialism in Asia and Africa as well as the Soviets all pointed to
the duality of U.S. policies toward decolonization and self-determination. In September
1957, these competing interests converged in Little Rock, Arkansas in the first year of
Eisenhower’s second term. President Eisenhower was forced to federalize the Arkansas
National Guard and send elements of the 101st Airborne Division to enforce the federal
laws mandating desegregation of all public schools. Media coverage struck deep wounds
into the U.S. reputation as a moral leader in human rights and equality. The
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institutionalized racism of the South was broadcast around the world constituting a major
propaganda victory for the Soviet Union in its attempts to discredit U.S. intentions
toward the Third World. Indonesia joined other nations, such as Libya and Brazil, in
questioning the credibility of the United States as the leader of freedom and democracy. 20
Eisenhower was able to regain some American stature but the Little Rock Crisis showed
how quickly domestic events could lead to a shift in international opinion during the Cold
War.
Just as the United States was beginning to reclaim some esteem with the world its
reputation was damaged again with the successful launch of the Sputnik-I satellite into
orbit by the Soviet Union in October 1957. The Soviets demonstrated technological
superiority over the U.S. by being the first nation to enter outer space successfully with a
184-pound machine that transmitted a simple beeping noise back to the world’s surface. 21
As Sputnik-I flew its orbit beeping, the reputation of the United States as the most
successful nation in the world suffered and the Soviet Union scored another propaganda
coup. The launch of Sputnik gave the Soviets an advantage in the neutral nations and the
Third World. The demonstration of Soviet technological superiority over the Americans
had an impact on the nations that wanted to be sure they would be on the side of the
superpower with the greater likelihood to win in a war or the greater military readiness. 22
After Sputnik-I, the Soviets possessed the advantage in neutralist opinion.
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Tensions in the Belgian Congo increased when Kasavubu won Leopoldville’s
municipal elections in 1957. At his mayoral inauguration in April 1958, he publicly
called for immediate recognition of the Congo as an independent nation. This growing
agitation by the Congolese to achieve their independence seems to have been accurately
reported to Secretary of State Dulles by his assistant after an African tour. But Dulles,
despite the calls of Kasavubu and other Congolese nationalists, felt no pressure to push
Belgium for the granting of independence until the people were ready. 23
Soon after the Sputnik crisis subsided, internal political strife in Lebanon began
boiling over and influencing U.S. actions in the Middle East in the spring of 1958. For
years, the United States used covert monetary aid through the CIA to buy support from
Lebanese politicians in order to maintain their pro-U.S. and pro-West orientation.
Positioned just north of Israel, Lebanon provided the United States with a crucial Arab
ally at a time when Arab Nationalism threatened its interests in the Middle East.
Although Eisenhower wished to avoid military intervention because it would threaten
U.S. credibility across the world, the loss of Lebanon to the anti-Western factions of the
Cold War would be “worse than the loss of China.” 24 Fortunately for the West, its
intervention in the Middle East at this point resulted in a no loss of the status quo. The
seemingly successful conclusion of the Lebanese crisis gave way to the continuation of a
crisis in eastern Asia; Chinese Communists and Nationalists began a second round of
fighting over islands in the Straits of Taiwan.
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The decades-old Chinese civil war, fought between the communists and the
Nationalists, was calmed during the Korean War. After the war’s end conflict between
the parties over the straits that separated them took place in 1954 and 1955. More than
two years of negotiations and tension finally erupted in the summer of 1958 just as the
United States was seeing success in Lebanon. The motivation of the Chinese
Communists in renewing the artillery bombardments of the offshore islands is in
contention. 25 Eisenhower believed the recent round of artillery barrages was not
motivated by the communist desire to regain the territory of the islands of Quemoy and
Matsu. He interpreted Soviet and Chinese Communist actions as a way for them to test
U.S. resolve and determine what concessions they could gain by rattling sabers. 26 With
this view of the events, and citing the Formosa Resolution of 1955, Eisenhower renewed
the U.S. position of being willing to defend their allies in the western Pacific against
aggression. 27 He also reiterated the need to resume negotiations and resolve the situation
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without an escalation into major conflict. 28 After Eisenhower invoked the Formosa
Resolution to demonstrate his ability to defend the Republic of China, Communist China
turned its attention back to negotiations.
While Eisenhower’s attention was focused on the possible outbreak of WWIII in
Asia, the Congolese independence struggle was ramping up. In October 1958, Patrice
Lumumba and others formed the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC); their political
party was the only one that represented multiple ethnicities and focused on the entirety of
the Congo. In December 1958, Lumumba traveled to Accra, Ghana as a representative of
his party to the All African People’s Conference held by Kwame Nkrumah. Upon his
return to the Congo, Lumumba held a rally in Leopoldville to announce the results of his
trip. Aggravation of the Congolese people led to days of violent protests and eventually
to a popular uprising in Leopoldville on January 4, 1959. Days after this violent outburst,
the King of Belgium announced his government’s intention to grant independence to the
Belgian Congo in the near future. 29
But none of the events in the Belgian Congo received much attention from the
U.S. policymakers because trouble was erupting closer to home. In January 1959, the
Cuban Revolution led by Fidel Castro succeeded in overthrowing U.S. ally Fulgencio
Batista. After years of fighting a guerilla campaign from the wilderness of Cuba, Castro
and his 26th of July Movement became the de facto government of Cuba in January 1959.
Increased instability so close to U.S. territory worried policymakers and especially
President Eisenhower. By November 1959, official U.S. policy shifted to opposition of
28
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Castro’s regime in Cuba. 30 In March 1960, the CIA was given authority to launch
operations designed to meet the national objective of overthrowing Castro. 31 Uncertainty
concerning Castro’s Cold War orientation and the instability of recent revolution so close
to the United States and in its traditional Caribbean sphere of influence heightened the
tensions in the last years of Eisenhower’s presidency.
During the spring of 1960 in the Belgian Congo, nationalists were preparing to
realize their dreams. Independence was planned for the summer and elections of an
independent Congo government were set for May 1960. Internal political wrangling led
to a split parliament with no single party gaining a majority of the seats. Lumumba’s
faction of MNC, MNC-L, won a plurality of the seats and Kasavubu’s ABAKO gained
the second most seats. These two leaders negotiated a government in the final days prior
to independence that placed Kasavubu as the President and Lumumba as the Prime
Minister.
Worry over Caribbean stability gave way to brief optimism toward diplomatic
progress in the overall Cold War. In December 1959, the Western allies agreed to a
summit meeting between them and the Soviet Union to take place in Paris during midMay 1960. The summit was preceded in world events by the crisis caused when an
American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over Soviet territory on the first of
May. At the opening of the summit, Khrushchev interrupted Charles de Gaulle’s remarks
as chairman of the proceedings to lash out at the United States. Khrushchev demanded
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apologies for violations of Soviet territory and punishment of all those in the American
government responsible for the program. Eisenhower saw this outburst as political
theater and dismissed it as such. At the speech’s conclusion, Eisenhower rose. He
acknowledged the U-2 operations but did not apologize for them and challenged the
notion given by the Soviets that the incident could serve to break up negotiations that
could possibly reduce the necessity of any espionage. 32 In the end, the summit broke
apart when Khrushchev remained away from the proceedings. Hope for peace seemed to
be dashed by U.S. espionage and Soviet brashness. This was the state of the Cold War
when Patrice Lumumba unexpectedly mounted the stage in Leopoldville on
Independence Day to deliver his own list of violations against his people.
The primary concern for U.S. policy toward decolonization was the threat of
instability to the world’s balance of power and the need to stop the spread of
communism. Lumumba’s speech signaled the end of the status quo in Africa that
exemplified the State Department’s description of pre-independence Africa in 1958. A
special assistant to the Secretary of State toured the continent in order to report back the
situation on the ground in Africa and the impending changes that would affect U.S.
interests. He foresaw a “very difficult and probably long period of uncertainty, bad
management, retrogression and conflict with a strong chance of violence in some areas.”
All of these factors contributed to there being “plenty of troubled waters for communist
fishing.” The report explained that the greatest danger lie in the instability created by he
termed “detribalization.” Modernizing populations from a tribal system to new ways of
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life would cause social, cultural and economic upheaval in populations that were largely
illiterate and practically leaping from the Iron Age into the twentieth century. 33
To the U.S. president, the choice of sponsorship for the Congo was clear. The
consequences of one of the most industrialized nations in Africa turning toward the
Soviets were enormous in 1960. Eisenhower had navigated the nation through the trials
of many crises that picked up intensity and frequency during his last years in office. U.S.
credibility in the Third World was damaged by the Little Rock crisis. The United States
was perceived to be losing the space race and subsequently the arms race. The truth
about the arms race was known to Eisenhower but only through the U2 program that
resulted in embarrassment and increased Cold War tensions. Throughout his second
term, country after country was threatened by communist aggression or subversion; the
closest of these, Cuba, was in the communist camp by the time of the Congo Crisis. With
a difficult election for his party and his retirement into peace and quiet only months
away, Eisenhower was confronted in the summer of 1960 with another nationalist leader
that was suspected of communist sympathies. If Lumumba was not communist, he was at
least a thorn in the side of U.S. ally Belgium and more trouble than desired in the last
months on the job. Considering all of the events, crises and pressures of the years
preceding Congolese independence, it is not incomprehensible that the United States
under Eisenhower’s leadership would want to do away with Lumumba in the easiest
manner possible and install a pseudocolonial regime friendly to the United States.
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Chapter Three: The Strategic Minerals of the Congo
Throughout the historiographical literature there are many reasons and
motivations associated by historians to U.S. and Western actions in the Congo. Various
approaches to the question of why the United States cared so deeply about the fate of the
central African nation result in many different answers. These answers and conclusions
boil down to the argument between national security and neocolonialism as motivation
for intervention. Strategic minerals and materials are commonly mentioned in one form
or another in most of the works related to the capitalist west’s quest for neocolonial
control in order to ensure access to great wealth and profit. However, most mentions are
superficial at best; authors tend to refer to the “great mineral wealth of the Congo” when
discussing why the country was so important. Minerals are indeed related to why the
United States established pseudocolonial control in the Congo but the relation is based in
national security strategy not wealth and profits.
Some authors point to copper as the major source of strategic mineral importance.
Copper was the most profitable mineral in the Congo; the amount of money made
through copper production assists any scholar arguing that capitalist greed motivated U.S.
actions. However, the United States did not get its copper from the Congo and makes
this linkage in their arguments weak. U.S. copper predominantly came from domestic
sources; U.S. copper production flowed between 43-65% of world production between
1950 and 1965. 34 The importance of other minerals is an area that is left unexplored in
the historiography leaving readers with the impression that capitalist greed motivated
U.S. actions in the Congo. This impression is inaccurate when U.S. availability,
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capability and utilization of lesser-known minerals are analyzed in the context of the late
1950s Cold War.
The Congo, and more specifically Katanga and Kasai Provinces, possesses a large
number of the most sought-after minerals in the world. Congolese mineral wealth is
measured in a number of historically mined ores: copper, tin, industrial diamonds,
columbium, gold, manganese, lead, zinc, uranium and cobalt. 35 As a center of large
amounts of necessary and valuable ores, it is easy to determine that the Congo is an
important nation to the interests of any industrialized nation.
Minerals play an integral role in national security scholars’ views on the topic as
well. While Weissman agrees with aspects of the mineral motivation, he does not include
the full spectrum of the Congolese mineral wealth. Thomas Borstelmann explains how
uranium was one of the most important Congolese minerals concerning U.S. interests in
his book about U.S. motivations in its relations with the racist South African regime
during the Cold War. 36 Borstelmann argues that uranium was so essential to U.S. foreign
policy that it drove the United States to acquiesce to South Africa’s apartheid policies in
order to secure a reliable and stable source of the mineral. This argument corresponds to
U.S. actions in the Congo, but in Borstelmann’s book it is focused solely on the role of
uranium to U.S. policy in the region. Uranium provided the most significant U.S.
security interest in the Congo beginning in WWII but it played a less significant role after
the United States secured a domestic source of uranium in the late 1950s. Afterward, the
U.S. interest was preventing Soviet access to Congolese uranium. By the time of the
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Congo Crisis, cobalt had replaced uranium as the most important U.S. security interest in
the Congo; this is where this paper departs from Borstelmann’s treatment of the Congo.
The importance of cobalt to U.S. national security will be introduced to support the
argument that the United States was willing to construct a pseudocolonial regime in the
Congo. Pseudocolonial control of the Congo would prevent communist access to
Congolese uranium as well as protect U.S. access to Congolese cobalt.
During the fifteen years following WWII and ending as the Congo Crisis was
erupting, the two most significant minerals to U.S. interests were uranium and cobalt
because of their roles in the arms races and the space race. When writing about U.S.
relations with the Congo and Belgium historians rarely mention uranium’s role. Even
less than uranium is the nearly non-existent mention of cobalt individually in the
expression of U.S. interests in the Congo. Examination of these two minerals and their
effects on world events in the fifties gives new perspective to the importance of the
Congo to U.S. national security interests.
The role of uranium and cobalt in shaping U.S. foreign policy toward the Congo
is the focus of this chapter. Examining this topic will assist in answering: how did
uranium and cobalt relate to U.S. foreign policy toward the Congo? Applied to the
Congo, U.S. policies were forced to incorporate the country’s strategically important
resources of uranium and cobalt. The desire to control access to these vital Congolese
minerals was a critical issue in shaping U.S. pseudocolonial policy toward the African
nation; controlling access was essential to U.S. national security interests.
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Congolese Uranium
Uranium assumed a major significance in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold
War. Classified as a minor metal by chemists, its principal uses were in ceramics,
luminescent paints, tool steels and chemicals until scientists working at Columbia
University prior to WWII discovered that it was fissionable and could be used in their
attempts to harness atomic energy. 37 They became concerned that Nazi Germany was
close to the same discovery, and hence warned the governments of Belgium and the
United States about the potential consequences. 38
The Belgian government was warned because the Belgian Congo possessed one
of the world’s three most productive uranium mines at Shinkolobwe in the Katanga
Province. 39 In fact, these mines provided the uranium for the atomic bombs that fell on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 40 The United States had already begun work during the war to
secure a steady and reliable source of uranium to feed the requirements for its research
and weapons production. In September 1944, after many rounds of negotiations, the
Tripartite Agreement, guaranteeing American access to uranium, was signed between the
United States, the United Kingdom and the exiled government of Belgium. 41
The Tripartite Agreement provided the United States its first, secure source of
uranium ore. The United States and the United Kingdom negotiated with Belgium and its
mining companies for exclusive access to the uranium produced out of the Shinkolobwe
mines in the Belgian Congo. The agreement provided for the delivery of 3,440,000
37
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pounds of uranium oxide and the right of first refusal of future uranium oxide for a period
of ten years after the delivery of the first 3,440,000 pounds. As part of the agreement, the
United States and United Kingdom agreed to provide equipment to restart the mines. The
three countries agreed that control of uranium was necessary for the protection of
civilization and that the agreement itself should be treated as a military secret. 42 The
good intentions of the three nations were only bound officially until approximately the
middle of the 1950s.
The basic properties and potential of uranium were known but its full potential for
destruction, and energy as well as any other uses were still to be researched. For this
reason, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 mandated control of information regarding such
research in order to safeguard it from those who would harness it for destructive
purposes. 43 The law also limited regulatory authority over and acquisition rights of
fissile materials; the law created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in order to
control U.S. possession.
The guarantees of the Tripartite Agreement extended for a little more than ten
years because exhaustion of the deposit was expected by that time. 44 The AEC, after
1946, began to look for other sources. In April of 1948, the AEC instituted a new
program “designed to implement the procurement of ore from both foreign and domestic
sources.” 45 This program provided incentives to search for domestic sources of uranium.
By guaranteeing prices for ore and a market for the uranium mined in the United States
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for a period of no less than ten years, the AEC encouraged the building of a United
States-centered uranium mining industry. 46 It succeeded in increasing U.S. uranium
concentrate production from 110 tons in 1948 to 1,450 tons in 1954. 47 By the end of the
1950s, the domestic programs sponsored by the AEC bore fruit and most of the uranium
required by the United States was produced domestically. 48 In fact, the United States
became the world’s leading producer of uranium in 1960. 49 Thereafter, because
maintaining access to Congolese ore for U.S. consumption was less important, the
strategic interest in Congolese uranium became its denial to the Soviet Union.
The need to maintain atomic superiority over the Soviet Union had important
consequences for U.S. relations with other nations. When looking overseas for new
sources, the United States had to look past some transgressions in order to provide the
necessary protection from the Soviet Union. Thomas Borstelmann describes the process
by which the United States gained dedicated access to uranium ore produced in South
Africa. One of his central arguments in Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle focuses on the U.S.
need to strengthen relations with the apartheid regime of South Africa at the same time
that the United States was in the early stages of its civil rights revolution. Borstelmann
contends that the Truman administration had to hold in check its views of the South
African government because it placed a higher priority on access to uranium. In
November of 1950, the United States and United Kingdom signed an agreement with the
South African government for the production and sale of uranium ore for a period of ten
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years. Once again, the United States and United Kingdom financed the equipping of the
mines. In addition, however, the United States supplied military aid to the South African
regime. 50 By dealing with an avowed racist regime, providing military aid and funding
the mining operation, this commitment exemplifies the lengths that the U.S. government
would go to in order to secure access to uranium. Borstelmann’s argument is conducive
to U.S. actions in the Congo; the United States was willing to go to great lengths,
including pseudocolonialism, to protect its strategic mineral interests.
The relationship between the United States and Belgium during the Truman
administration was based heavily on uranium procurement. As the colonial master of the
Belgian Congo, the government in Brussels secured a satisfactory deal in the Tripartite
Agreement of 1944. However, the agreement obscured important tensions; the Belgians
were suspicious of U.S. intentions about their colony. The Americans pressured the
Belgians to grant the Congo independence in order to avoid instability caused by a restive
indigenous population. Despite reliance on U.S. economic and military reconstruction
aid, the leaders of Belgium recognized their nation’s importance to the United States in
the fight against Soviet communism. The Belgians possessed powerful leverage to resist
U.S. pressure to grant independence. The arms race that began after the Soviets exploded
their first atomic bomb in 1949 garnered the small nation of Belgium an edge over the
world’s most powerful nation. As the world’s leading producer of uranium ore in the
early fifties, and all of it guaranteed to the Americans and British, the Belgians realized
they could minimize U.S. calls for colonial independence. 51
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The Belgians resented U.S. pressure because they perceived U.S. demands not as
a call for colonial independence but as an attempt to put the United States in a position to
exploit Congolese resources and wealth. This suspicion began shortly after the United
States began to deal with the Belgians for uranium ore during WWII and continued after
the war. Belgian mistrust was so virulent that the U.S. did not place any Central
Intelligence Agency personnel in the Belgian Congo until 1951 for fear that Brussels
would misinterpret U.S. intentions. 52 Brussels feared the United States would move to
push Belgium out of the Congo in order to secure the economic benefits of the territory
for themselves under the guise of anticolonialism.
The nascent United Nations provided another point of contention for U.S.-Belgian
relations. Formed at the end of WWII, the United Nations had a primary goal of
equalizing all nations in a forum to discuss and resolve conflicts peacefully. The Cold
War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union reflected actions and
blocs within the United Nations. The Soviet Union for years had supported
anticolonialism in its quest to oust capitalist governments among developing nations.
U.N. pressure on Belgium about its colonies caused Brussels to contemplate withdrawing
from the international organization. 53
The Korean War made the U.S. position even more difficult. The U.S.
desperately needed Belgian support in the United Nations for its fight against North
Korean and Communist Chinese forces on the Korean peninsula. A Belgian withdrawal
from the United Nations concerned the United States because it would weaken the
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standing of the organization as it fought its war against communist aggression in Korea
that symbolized the proving ground for collective security against aggression. 54
Ultimately successful in retaining Belgian membership in the United Nations, the United
States also realized how delicate was the task of balancing between anticolonialism and
stability. Forced to side with Europe’s colonial powers, the United States saw the power
that small nations might exercise. Faced with these realities, the United States declared it
might accept a form of association between the Congo and Belgium. U.S. policymakers
realized that premature independence would present a danger worse than indigenous
people restive under colonialism. 55
Multiple problems presented difficult challenges to successive U.S.
administrations. The need for material for atomic weapons had to be balanced with the
need to prevent instability that would allow Soviet influence to gain ground across the
world. In WWII, the United States avowed its anticolonialist views and intentions for the
post-war world. Unfortunately for their intentions, the Cold War solidified almost as
soon as WWII was finished and new problems of the post-war world mixed with the
advent of atomic weapons. The most dangerous technology in the history of the world
forced the United States to place higher priority on access to uranium than on
anticolonialism.
The 1940s and 1950s witnessed the furious U.S. search for a sustainable source of
uranium. Staying ahead of the Soviet Union in atomic weaponry and technology required
54

Jonathan E. Helmreich, United States Relations with Belgium and the Congo, 1940-1960 (Newark:
University of Delaware Press, 1998): 153; “Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Legal Adviser for Far
Eastern Affairs (Snow) to the Planning adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson)” October 19,
1950, FRUS 1950, vol. VII: 983. The neutralization of nations was a concern discussed because it would
“subtract from the power of the United Nations to enforce its guarantee” of security to all nations and
remove the neutralized State “from the roll of the United Nations that stand ready to oppose and punish an
aggressor…”
55
“McGregor to Dept.,” 6 August 1954, FRUS 1952-1954, vol. XI, pt. I: 123.

39

enormous amounts of fissile material. To secure these requirements, the United States
made deals with colonial masters and oppressively racist governments. Defense against
the Soviet atomic threat was perceived greater than the independence of colonies and
nations in Africa. Balancing these factors was necessary until the United States was
successful in the development of its domestic uranium production programs. Once
domestic production outpaced foreign procurement and Congolese uranium was no
longer needed and U.S. policy shifted to denial of access to the Soviets.
Uranium procurement drove the Eisenhower administration to place a higher
value on stability of the Congo provided by its colonial master. This support was against
long-standing U.S. commitments to anticolonialism and self-determination. Forced to
sideline these intentions until the late 1950s, the United States benefited from its push for
domestic uranium production. Ultimately, uranium drove the U.S. desire for stability in
the Congo. Whether stability was achieved through colonialism or through
pseudocolonialism, it fulfilled the U.S. objective of controlling access to uranium.
Congolese Cobalt
As 1960 approached, U.S. domestic production of uranium reduced the value of
Congolese ore. The U.S. national security interest concerning Congolese uranium ore
now shifted to prevention of communist access to it. U.S. access to Congolese minerals,
however, still remained a driving force in U.S. policy toward the nation; U.S. supply of
cobalt hinged on access to ores in southern Congo. The same area in the Congo that
produced the world’s richest known uranium is the origin for the highest quality cobalt
known to man. Due to the lack of a domestic source the United States imported 92% of
its consumed cobalt in 1959. Because the majority of this cobalt originated in the Congo
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the United States retained its focus on keeping the Congo stable. 56 In order to understand
cobalt’s role as a forcing function of U.S. foreign policy, it is necessary to examine its
background and history, its importance to technology as well as its importance to the
United States.
Cobalt is an element found in various locations throughout the world. Its
predominant use prior to WWI was in the coloration of ceramics and pottery. This usage
began as early as the ancient Egyptians and continued through various civilizations such
as the Chinese and the Persians. 57 Industrialization brought changes to the utilization of
metals as alloys to strengthen steel. It is in this capacity that cobalt witnessed an increase
in its demand. In the post WWI period, cobalt was discovered in the Katanga area of the
Belgian Congo by Union Miniere de Haut Katanga (UMHK). By 1926, the Belgian
Congo was the world’s leading producer of cobalt. Congolese ore was mined along its
border with then-Northern Rhodesia (present day Zambia) in what is commonly referred
to as the Copperbelt. The production of these two nations combined has served at least
two-thirds of the world’s requirements for as long as cobalt has been in demand. The
Copperbelt is known for its vast reserves of high quality minerals and its role as the
world’s leading producer of copper, tin and cobalt during most of the twentieth century.
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Additionally, Congolese cobalt was valuable because it is produced as a by-product of the
copper extraction processes. 58
Between the end of WWII and Congolese independence cobalt was a major
ingredient in industrial production. At the end of WWII, the demand for cobalt in war
production tapered off but the advent of the jet age and the space race returned it to a
prominent place in demand for minerals. The increase in television and the spread of
information affected U.S. requirements for cobalt. Cobalt use and prices fluctuated in the
fifteen years after WWII thanks to the Korean War, the start of the jet age and the
recession of the late 1950s. Despite fluctuation, cobalt remained on the U.S. critical
materials list and the United States purchased millions of tons of cobalt ore to stockpile in
preparation for WWIII. 59
The single greatest factor providing cobalt its strategic value is its importance to
the steel industry, explicitly in the area of high temperature alloys important to jet and
rocket engines. A variety of lesser important civilian uses for cobalt exist: permanent
magnets, blue pigmentation in ceramics and glass as well as cutting tools in industrial
production. Civilian uses are varied but cobalt’s major use is as an alloy; it is this use
that provides its strategic importance to the United States. 60 The value placed on cobalt
as an alloy is critical to understanding why it played such an important role in U.S.
policymaking during the period between WWII and the independence of the Congo in
1960. Wars usually catalyze research and development that result in new technologies
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presented in the war’s aftermath. Cobalt was integral to the expansion of two of these
technologies in the 1950s: jet engines and rockets.
By the end of WWII most major powers were researching jet engines and their
application in fighter aircraft. The Americans, British and Japanese all tried to be the
first to possess jet aircraft during the war but the Germans prevailed in the race to turn jet
technology into a military advantage with the introduction of the Messerschmitt Me-262
jet aircraft into the skies of WWII Europe. While this introduction came too late to alter
the outcome of the war for the Germans, it signaled the dawn of the jet age in both
warfare and civilian uses. Jet development continued in earnest and became an element
of the impending arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union after the
beginning of the Cold War.
During the opening phase of the Cold War an arms race ensued that included jet
aircraft. The primary delivery method for an attack from one of the superpowers to the
other was the strategic bomber. A primary role for fighter aircraft at this time was as
interceptor. Interceptor aircraft needed development in order to destroy an inbound
formation of bombers before they could reach their target on U.S. or Soviet soil.
Bombers flew at high altitudes and the atomic weapons they delivered were destructive;
the strategy was for fighter-interceptors to get to the bomber formations at a high altitude
quickly in order to destroy them at a safe distance from friendly territory. As bomber
development progressed, they flew higher and faster; thus, interceptors needed to fly
higher and faster.
This competition led to the constant introduction of newer and faster aircraft to
counter the newest threat from the opposing side. In the United States, jets were
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introduced at a rapid pace to keep up with Soviet development. A large number of U.S.
jet aircraft were manufactured in the 1950s, for example: 2,100 F-86s and 315 F-2Hs in
1953, 600 B-47s and 760 F-84s in 1954 as well as 792 F-100s, 516 F-102s and 173 B-52s
in 1957. 61 These numbers are just a sample of the total jet aircraft production during the
1950s but account for 9,782 jet engines. It is estimated that each jet engine required
about 100 pounds of cobalt; this translates into a requirement of 978,200 pounds of cobalt
for just this small sample of aircraft production. 62 Jet production was the centerpiece to
defense strategy until the science of rocketry matured to the level requisite to be a reliable
system of weapons delivery.
Rockets made their debut in warfare in WWII as a result of the German war
machine. The Germans attacked the British during the last stages of the war using V-1
and V-2 rockets. After the war, a number of the scientists who developed these weapons
were brought to the United States to conduct research and development for the
Americans. Wernher Von Braun, the designer of the V-2 rocket, led five hundred of his
fellow scientists to the United States. Von Braun worked for the U.S. Army on the
Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) program. After the Soviet launch of
Sputnik, his work was transferred to the nascent NASA where he led the development
program for the Saturn V rocket. 63
The delivery of atomic warheads via long-range missiles was the next innovation
in the U.S. defense strategy; this innovation required advanced rocketry design. After
Sputnik the Strategic Air Command, the U.S. Air Force’s organization responsible with
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the delivery of nuclear weapons to their targets, instituted a program to add ballistic
missiles to their arsenal. In 1958, it reorganized its command to include Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) units but these units still did not possess their missiles. Over
the course of the next five years, these units were stocked with hundreds of ballistic
missiles. Including cruise missiles and decoy missiles, the Strategic Air Command grew
from zero missiles in 1958 to 631 in 1963. This arsenal grew until it reached its ceiling
in 1969 of 1,065 ballistic ICBMs. These numbers demonstrate the remarkable growth in
missile capability that took place within the initial five years following Sputnik as well as
throughout the 1960s. The significant growth of Strategic Air Command’s missile
capability described here does not take into account the U.S. Army or Navy’s missile
growth, nor does it detail NASA’s requirements for rockets and missiles. 64 This
expansion of missile capability adds to the value of cobalt to the national security
requirements of the United States. It demonstrates why the United States felt the mineral
was important enough to extend pseudocolonial control over the Congo. The United
States needed to secure access to cobalt in the Congo because the majority of its imports
originated there. 65
The same rockets being designed to deliver warheads to targets across the ocean
were to be used to carry astronauts into space. The American Atlas rocket program was
established years prior to the Sputnik launch in 1954 but the first successful launch
occurred weeks after Sputnik officially started the space race in December 1957. A
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number of other U.S. rocket programs were in full production in the late 1950s: Titan,
Juno, Thor and Jupiter. Added to these at the end of 1959 was the Saturn rocket program.
A large number of the subsequent space launches in the late 1950s and early 1960s used
Atlas and Saturn rockets.
NASA was assigned the responsibility for the crash program to catch up to the
Soviet rocketry capabilities after the Americans were defeated in the opening shot of the
space race. The Germans scientists under Von Braun represented the technological
knowledge required for a quick U.S. recovery. Cobalt, in large quantities represented
another essential ingredient. The United States began development of ballistic missile
capability at the end of WWII but it was not a high priority until the Soviets demonstrated
possession of the H-Bomb in 1953 and again with the 1957 Sputnik-I launch. Sputnik
sparked American anxiety; governmental reorganization within the next year resulted in
the formation of NASA as well as the consolidation of rocketry design and
manufacturing under the auspices of the Air Force.
The thrust required to launch a rocket into outer space required the production of
massive power. When fired, a rocket engine is essentially a contained explosion caused
by the ignition of fuels such as liquid hydrogen or liquid oxygen. This ignition causes
incredible heat that required metals that could withstand the immense heat. It is these
high temperatures that make cobalt vital to the any nation’s space program. The U.S.
space program was just another episode of competition in the Cold War. The space race
provided further justification for the United States to guarantee its access to cobalt and
limit Soviet access to cobalt in the Congo through pseudocolonial control there.
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The protection and stockpiling of strategic minerals is a process that was adopted
by the United States and its allies after WWII. The process was focused on ensuring
enough raw materials to feed the resumption of wartime manufacturing of weapons on a
WWII scale. The American Stockpiling Program’s objective was to acquire sufficient
stocks of strategic and critical materials to offset the anticipated deficit between what
American industry would have on hand and what would be needed in the event of war.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had submitted five years as the planning factor for the next
worldwide conflict; their contemporary experience fighting the Korean War showed them
and the committee in charge of managing the Stockpiling Program the importance of
cobalt to military production. 66
The Korean War was a real world example of the necessity of maintaining access
to the materials needed to wage war. U.S. policymakers learned from this experience and
continued through the rest of the 1950s to work towards secure access to cobalt. The
most important source of cobalt to the United States in the 1950s was the Belgian Congo.
In 1955, cobalt from the Belgian Congo accounted for 67% of U.S. imports of the metal.
Another 21% came from its metropole Belgium but 87% of Belgian cobalt originated in
Belgian Congo ore. 67 The year 1955 was the second record year of cobalt consumption
in the United States; 33% more cobalt was used by U.S. industry than in 1954. This
increase resulted principally from larger use of cobalt metal in high-temperature alloys. 68
The importance and production of cobalt only continued to increase during the
rest of the 1950s as the United States entered into a full-scale space race. In 1959, U.S.
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industry consumed 9.9 million pounds of cobalt representing the largest quantity since
1953 and 31% more than in 1958. High temperature alloys accounted for 24% of total
U.S. consumption that was 10% greater than in 1958. 69 Analysts from the Bureau of
Mines reported that the Belgian Congo continued to be the largest supplier of cobalt to
the United States by providing 56% of all U.S. imports. This number is increased to 82%
of all U.S. imports when Belgian exports that originated in the Belgian Congo are added.
During the 1950s, U.S. industry’s thirst for cobalt grew exponentially. This thirst
was easily quenched by guaranteed access to cobalt ore in the Belgian Congo due to the
stability maintained by the Belgians in the colony. Like uranium, U.S. cobalt
requirements forced the United States to acquiesce in its anticolonial approaches to
Belgium to grant independence to the Congo. After the United States made negative
statements about the Belgian management of their colony to the United Nations, the
Belgian public showed their anger. The Belgians argued that Congolese materials were
essential to defense of the free world and U.S. comments were incongruous with the
intent to build up a strong and free Europe. 70 With levels of consumption in the United
States as they were in the 1950s, it is not difficult to understand the leverage Belgium
held over their American critics. As with uranium in the Belgian Congo and in South
Africa, the United States was willing to overlook colonial misconduct and eventually risk
their own pseudocolonial control to maintain access to cobalt reserves.
Just as the United States took necessary steps to guarantee their access to cobalt,
they also launched operations to reduce Soviet access to the same materials. In 1953, the
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National Security Council discussed and supported the purchase of cobalt ore from
Finland. The Finnish deal not only would add to U.S. stockpiles but also would deny the
Soviets another source of cobalt. 71 The trend of denying access to the Soviet Union
continued. In 1954 discussions on relaxation of the embargo against communist
countries, policymakers recommended that cobalt continue to be embargoed because it
was one of the few critical materials that were overwhelmingly produced in the free
world. 72 Embargo of cobalt ensured strained access to the minerals by the Soviet Union.
There is a commonality between strategic minerals and materials. Their value lies
within their place in the greater strategy of the Cold War. Natural resources have always
been a motivation for nations and other entities to go to war. Modern warfare is no
different when it comes to this motivation. At the time of independence in the Congo, it
possessed some of the richest uranium in the world and provided 75% of the U.S.
consumption of cobalt. Although no data concerning Soviet minerals is available, the
Soviet Union undoubtedly possessed sources of each of these materials; however, it was
of vital national security interest for the United States to protect its access to these
materials and deny Soviet access to them. 73 Natural resources played a significant role in
U.S. intervention into the Congo Crisis. When placed within the context of the
contemporary Cold War situation, the U.S. thirst for these minerals becomes less greedy
in appearance. Because of the perils of losing the arms or space races, U.S. actions to
71

“Memorandum by the Secretary of State and the Director of Mutual Security (Harriman) to the Executive
Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay),” January 19, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954, vol. I: 925 and
“Progress Report on a Program of Possible Actions to Lessen Finland’s Economic Dependence on the
Soviet Bloc” June 22, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954, vol. VIII: 766.
72
“National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-100-3-54): Consequences of a Relaxation of Non-Communist
Controls on Trade with the Soviet Bloc,” March 23, 1954, FRUS 1952-1954, vol. I: 1121.
73
Joseph. Bilbrey Jr. and Dorothy T. McDougal, “Cobalt,” (Table 9- Free World Production of cobalt by
countries), Bureau of Mines Minerals Yearbook: Metals and Minerals (except Fuels), 1960 vol. I
(Washington D.C.: GPO, 1961): 388: “Production data for East Germany and U.S.S.R. are not available,
and no estimates for these two countries are included in the world total.”

49

secure access to strategic minerals, even through the establishment of pseudocolonialism
in the Congo, can be viewed as a justified national security imperative.
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Chapter Four: Congolese Geostrategic Value
When considering the motivations behind U.S. foreign intervention many details
become important. As detailed in earlier chapters, the contemporary world situation as
well as strategic resources played an integral role in the decision to intervene in another
nation’s affairs. If the Cold War was fought by either side to prevent the destruction of
the world in a nuclear WWIII then both superpowers had to plan for a conventional war
fought across the world. This is where analysis of the geostrategic importance of the
Congo enters into the calculations of importance to U.S. national security interests. The
United States executed its policies in regard to Africa with the idea of protecting essential
materials, resources and routes. Africa was viewed as a secondary center of gravity in
the manner that it provided enormous sources of strategic materials as well as routes of
travel to the Middle East and Asia in case of worldwide warfare. All of the countries in
Africa possess some level of strategic importance to the United States in 1960 when they
are viewed through this context.
Congolese Influence on its Neighbors
In the state of world affairs at the independence of the Congo in June 1960, a
number of factors would have provided worry and stress to U.S. decision makers.
Tension would have been present due to the soon-to-be declared independence of twelve
African nations after the Congo with eight of them in the month of August alone. This
presented a situation where, by the end of 1960, five African nations in the proximity of
the Congo were newly free states being courted by both superpowers for favor in their
nations. A pro-western leader led the Congo-Brazzaville, which became independent in
August 1960. The rest of the new nations’ loyalties were undeclared: Cameroon, Gabon,
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Central African Republic and Sudan. Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania would all
follow to independence by 1963. 74 An unfriendly government in Leopoldville could
quickly influence the heart of Africa in a negative manner for the United States. An
unfriendly government in Leopoldville that was controlled by communists could be
exploited by the Soviets to spread their influence into the Congo’s neighbors thus
creating a Soviet sphere of influence in central Africa. The danger of a Soviet sphere of
influence in this region was greater because it lay just south of the North African
countries that lined the coast of the Mediterranean Sea and the northern approach to the
Suez Canal.
There is little evidence that either side of the Cold War believed the continent of
Africa represented the major maneuver battlefield in the next world conflict. Both sides
prepared their conventional maneuver forces for a battle in central Europe; the United
States exercised to protect against a Soviet invasion through the Fulda Gap. However,
Africa possessed certain traits, such as the vast mineral wealth explained in the previous
chapter, which ensured it would play a vital role in the planning for operations during a
global conventional conflict. In this chapter, the Congo will be examined to determine its
values to U.S. national security in terms of its geographic location on the earth. Where
the Congo sits on the globe was valuable in geostrategic terms based on the assumed
military necessities of the next war. Because the next war was not forecasted to take
place on the African continent, U.S. policy toward Africa was focused on its supporting
role in case of conflict.
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The Congo was the largest of the African nations and touched nine other
surrounding nations. It was viewed as the litmus for the rest of the continent: if the
Congo went communist, the rest of Africa would go communist. Because of its size, the
Congo can influence the entire continent; using the Congo as a base of power, the Soviets
could gain influence over the surrounding nations and eventually exert pressure on North
Africa. Some in the U.S. intelligence community believed the Soviets intended to
outflank the Western alliance by gaining control over Africa. 75
U.S. defense officials still viewed the Soviet use of conventional forces highly
unlikely due to the assumption that Eisenhower would retaliate with nuclear weapons.
The U.S. intelligence community believed the Soviet government realized that neither
side could win in a nuclear exchange and would act to appear to be the more peaceful of
the two antagonists in order to split the Western alliance and gain support of world
opinion. Despite the superpowers’ preparation for nuclear war, U.S. intelligence showed
the possibility that Soviet intentions, as early as 1956, were to gain nuclear parity with
the United States in order to achieve freedom to launch conventional operations. In a
1956 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), the intelligence community reported that the
Soviet policy of “peaceful coexistence” was essentially a propaganda campaign to gain
favorable position in other nations. 76 The Soviets were attempting to gain influence over
smaller countries by avoiding force; however, the U.S. defense establishment would have
still reviewed strategy for a WWIII fought by conventional means. In this review they
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would determine the perceived enemy courses of action in order to develop a strategy to
counter this aggression.
The generally accepted Soviet intention, including by Eisenhower officials, was to
cross the border into West Germany and take control of Europe. Using the perceived
Soviet intentions for the regions of the world contained in the NIE of 1956, it can be
discerned that these same regions would be of importance in a conventional war and the
Soviet defense ministry would be planning for this contingency. The NIE explains how
the Soviets were using diplomacy and propaganda in their attempt to replace American
influence in the Middle East; this influence would be used to secure access to oil. 77 It is
safe to assume the oil in the Middle East would be of key strategic value to both
superpowers in the event of a conventional world war based on the large numbers of
mechanized forces both powers would project.
Access to Middle East oil is precisely why the United States placed such
importance on controlling the Mediterranean Sea. The Mediterranean provided access to
three continents and the enormous oil resources of the Middle East. It also provided the
shortened route to the Middle East via the Suez Canal. If the next world war required
Middle Eastern oil the West needed a route to transport troops and armament to the fight;
this route would be through the Suez Canal. Control of the Mediterranean Sea and
influence in the nations of North Africa were crucial to the defense plans of the United
States and the Western alliance.
The importance of the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal to U.S. national
security is proven by the placement of defense assets in the region such as
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communications and radar relay sites, signals collection sites as well as refueling and
logistics bases. Morocco represented extreme value to the United States because it’s
territory could control access to the Mediterranean Sea at the Straits of Gibraltar; the
United States stationed early warning systems; radar and signal collection assets there to
protect the Straits. 78 U.S. airbases in Libya were used until 1971 for deployment of
bombing, intelligence and transport capabilities. The Suez Canal’s value to U.S. national
security is indicated by the protection of its Red Sea approach by U.S. forces stationed in
Ethiopia. The United States exploited the friendship of Ethiopia by emplacing
communications and signal collection bases there to control the approach to the Red Sea.
The Ethiopian territory presented additional benefits because it allowed the United States
a staging base for any ground forces needed for the Middle East. 79
The U.S. position in Africa was solidified in most of eastern and southern Africa.
A black African government that remained loyal to the west after WWII governed
Ethiopia. The British still managed or influenced Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and
Botswana; the Belgians were still in control of Rwanda-Burundi and South Africa
controlled its territory including the disputed Southwest Africa. Pro-western white
governments continued to rule in Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Malawi (in
the form of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland) until 1963 and Portugal
controlled Angola and Mozambique until the 1970s. Whether governed by European
allies or friendly African governments, the United States enjoyed friendly relations along
the eastern coast of Africa from Ethiopia to South Africa. With friends in these locations,
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the United States retained secure air transit routes across the southern half of Africa as
well as secure sea-lanes from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean. These routes
represented a strategic necessity in preparation for WWIII. But any change in the
orientation of African nations after their independence from European control could alter
the security of these routes.
The threat of expanding Soviet influence throughout central Africa through use of
a pro-Soviet Congolese government was exacerbated by Lumumba’s extreme
nationalism. History shows his fiery speech insulting America’s ally Belgium was just
the defense of his new nation and people to their former oppressor. In the context of the
summer of 1960, it is easy to see how Lumumba’s nationalist intent could be
misinterpreted and be considered dangerous to western objectives in the Cold War. The
fact that Lumumba’s speech and style were well received by populations still under
foreign rule in other colonies adds to the danger of Lumumba’s influence. Fear within
the U.S. intelligence community that the Congo could be used as a base for spreading
non-western ideas would be increased by Lumumba’s retention of power in the Congo.
Congolese Infrastructure
The Congo’s geographic location is somewhat intangible when it comes to
assessing it for strategic value. Anyone can look at a map and determine that a country as
large as the Congo lying in the middle of a continent can affect its neighbors. More than
intangible, unsubstantiated value is necessary to make the Congo play a greater role in
national defense strategy. The Congo becomes more important to U.S. planners once
African infrastructure is taken into consideration. If the U.S. defense establishment
assumed a key front in WWIII would be in the Middle East, they would assume the
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Soviets would look to contest or block U.S. routes into that theater. Soviet generals and
planners would understand the importance of the Mediterranean Sea, the Suez Canal and
even the waters surrounding the coasts of South Africa. Initial steps in any Soviet attack
would make security of these routes integral to its plan.
The situation in 1960 supported the importance of these water routes. In 1956,
the United States demonstrated the value it placed on an open Suez Canal when it
disagreed with its staunchest allies and sided with the Soviets and the Egyptians.
Eisenhower well understood the importance of a shortcut to Asia and the Middle East.
Operations in WWII had been launched to secure Mediterranean Sea access and the Suez
Canal as a shortcut to Asia and the Middle East. Although the situation in Egypt seemed
stable by 1960, Eisenhower officials knew better than to assume it would always remain
that way.
The sea-lanes off the coast of South Africa would drastically increase in
importance in the case of any seizure or blocking of the Suez Canal. Thomas
Borstelmann argued in Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle that U.S. acquiescence to South
African Apartheid was due to the uranium produced by South Africa. 80 It is agreed that
uranium production plays an integral role in assessing strategic value to any nation as
discussed concerning Congolese uranium in the previous chapter. Like the Congo, South
Africa’s mineral wealth is joined by its geographic location in the assessment of its value
to U.S. national security. A friendly government in control at the southern tip of Africa is
crucial to maintaining an alternate route to Asia and the Middle East in the case of
Mediterranean Sea or Suez Canal denial by Soviet forces. The 1956 NIE assumed the
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Soviet Union would use subversive means to gain influence over areas of Africa. 81 The
west presumed many in the anti-apartheid struggle to be communists or at least
sympathetic to leftist causes. In the case of WWIII, it can be assumed the Soviet Union
would have incited factions in South Africa in order to create instability; this would be
done to limit, reduce or prevent western access to minerals of southern Africa. It would
have the additional effect of making the sea-lanes around South Africa unreliable.
With any reduction to access to the Suez Canal and the sea-lanes around South
Africa, the United States would need to ensure it had access to routes across Africa to get
to Asia and the Middle East. These routes would be needed for troop and equipment
transport as well as refueling pints for the transfer of combat and logistical aircraft
needed for the fight. This is precisely where the Congo would see its importance
increased. There are very few railroads on the continent of Africa; many were already in
a state of disrepair by the time of the Congo Crisis. The Congolese province of Katanga
was at the center of the Congo Crisis. It was the first province to secede from the new
nation and retained its own independence for nearly three years. Katanga’s mineral
wealth in copper, cobalt, uranium, tin and diamonds is the focus of a great deal of the
historiography of the Crisis. The literature lacks another important facet of Katanga’s
importance to the region if the Crisis is analyzed through a geostrategic lens. Katanga’s
capital, Elisabethville, connects the Atlantic coast of southern Africa to the Indian coast
of southern Africa via railroad.
A series of railroads were constructed beginning soon after the Europeans
discovered the enormous mineral wealth of inner Africa. The Copperbelt region that
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covers southern Congo in Katanga and Northern Rhodesia eventually came to house the
connection between two major African railways. The Benguela Railway begins in the
Angolan port city of Lobito, connects via Elisabethville in Katanga to the Zambian rail
lines. These lines link to the Beira Railway which ends in the Mozambican port city of
Beira. This series of rail connections in 1960 would allow troops, equipment and
supplies to be transported across the African continent from the Angolan port of Lobito to
the Mozambican port of Beira. If the Congo remained friendly to the West, this alternate
rail route would begin and end through contiguous friendly nations. If the sea-lanes
surrounding the southern portion of Africa were too dangerous to transport military
forces, the Benguela-Beira rail line could be used to project western military power to the
Indian coast of Africa and onward to the Middle East.
The location of the Congo in the center of Africa garnered the nation an increase
in value to U.S. strategy. A Congo unfriendly to the United States could threaten most
prized geostrategic objective in the region: security of the Suez Canal. The spread of
communism to the Congo would also result in the denial of alternate routes across Africa
for the United States. Not only was the Congo viewed as the hub for influence in Africa,
it also possessed the connection necessary to make southern Africa’s railroads into a
viable transcontinental land route. The Congo’s ability to influence strategic national
security objectives of the United States in case of WWIII provides justification to U.S.
actions to establish pseudocolonial control in the Congo.
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Chapter Five: U.S. Pseudocolonialism During the Congo Crisis
The previous chapters have described and detailed the importance of the Congo to
U.S. national security interests and how these interests justified U.S. pseudocolonialism
in the Congo. The last years of the Eisenhower administration were filled were nearly
continuous crises that occupied U.S. leadership. These crises occurred during the period
in the late 1950s that witnessed increased tension between the superpowers in the Cold
War. The campaign to contain the spread of Soviet communism was the main objective
of the United States and actions it took were related to meeting the goals of this objective.
The United States saw the Congo as an important newly formed nation in Africa because
it was the hub of nine other new nations that possessed conditions that were ripe for the
expansion of communism. Strategic minerals were just as important to U.S. interests and
the Congo possessed uranium needed for the development and construction of nuclear
weapons. The Congo was also the leading U.S. source of the cobalt it required to build
and maintain its superiority in nuclear arms as well as the space program. Finally, the
Congo provided the United States and its allies alternate routes to the Middle East and
Asia should conflict between the West and the Soviet Union erupt into full scale
conventional warfare.
It is argued here that the United States acted to establish a pseudocolonial regime
in the Congo in order to protect its national security interests concerning containment,
strategic minerals and geostrategy. The value of the Congo to U.S. national security has
been established. But how did U.S. interests translate into U.S. actions in the context of
the Congo Crisis? This question can most directly be answered by focusing on the
component of the crisis that highlighted all of the U.S. interests: the Katanga Secession.
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Maintaining a stable, anti-communist government in the province, protecting the
province’s mineral wealth and ensuring access to Katanga’s strategic location were goals
conducive to the interests of the United States previously explained in this examination.
U.S. orientation toward the governments of the Congo and Katanga during the
Congo Crisis are descriptive of the value the United States placed on stability in these
areas. Additionally, how the United States interacted with these governments
demonstrates the value placed in having reliably anti-communist leaders running the
Congo. At this point in the Cold War, the emerging nations of the decolonizing Third
World presented a juggernaut of confusion and competing interests to both superpowers.
Correspondence between U.S. policymakers indicates their feelings toward the leaders
and politicians of the Congo and Katanga. Analysis of this correspondence relates that
U.S. policymakers kept in mind the reliability of Congolese politicians as well as their
willingness to protect U.S. interests.
The attitudes of U.S. leaders toward Congolese leaders assist understanding the
objectives of the United States in the Congo Crisis. However, the United States refrained
from playing a direct role in the Crisis. President Eisenhower refused to intervene
militarily and instead supported the Congolese leaders’ invitation for U.N. intervention.
On its face, Eisenhower’s actions appear as a benevolent way to prevent the superpowers
from escalating this conflict to war if one or both sides intervened. This interpretation of
his actions is present in the literature but most authors on the topic disagree. These
authors consider, as in this paper, that the United Nations acted as the instrument of U.S.
policy in the Congo Crisis. Once this concept is accepted, the actions of the United
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Nations, specifically in relation to Katanga, during the Congo Crisis can be explained as
the derivative of U.S. objectives in the Congo as the situation changed over time.
The goal of the United States was to protect its national security interests in the
Katanga by ensuring a stable and reliably anti-communist government ruled the Congo.
The Congolese province of Katanga sat in the south of the nation and bordered Angola on
its east, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) on its south and southeast and lay across Lake
Tanganyika from Tanzania. Katangese Provincial President Moise Tshombe controlled
the province at the time of independence and was assisted by a large number of white
Belgian administrators, advisers and managers of the Belgian mining company Union
Miniere. Katanga possessed the majority of Congolese mineral wealth especially its
uranium and cobalt reserves.
Mineral wealth was the catalyst that created Katanga’s, and thus the Congo’s,
multi-faceted value to the United States. To improve their ability to extract this mineral
wealth, Belgium and Union Miniere built railroads connecting the mineral wealth of
Katanga to the ports along both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. This system of
interconnecting railways provided geostrategic military value as a ground line of
communication to move troops and material across the continent of Africa in case of war.
Of all the areas within the borders of the Congo at the time of the crisis in the early
1960s, Katanga is the only province that provides this level of value to U.S. national
security and thus provided the reason for the United States to install a pseudocolonial
regime in the Congo.
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Congolese Leadership
Through political bargaining and wrangling, the first independent Congolese
government took power from the Belgians in a ceremony on June 30, 1960. The
Congolese government represented a compromise between the two parties with the most
votes during the May 1960 parliamentary elections. Joseph Kasavubu, leader of ABAKO
or the Alliance des Bakongo, served as the President of the Congo and Patrice Lumumba,
leader of MNC-L or Mouvement National Congolais-Lumumba, served as the Prime
Minister. Kasavubu’s political power was derived from tribal and cultural affiliation and
was primarily based in the Congolese capital of Leopoldville. Lumumba’s MNC-L was
the largest nationalist party and the only party to cross tribal and cultural divides to call
for a Congolese national identity.
At the independence ceremony the King of Belgium, King Baudouin, delivered a
somewhat patronizing speech calling for the new Congolese government to take
independence slow and look to the Belgians as their guide. President Kasavubu rose to
deliver a formal and cordial speech on behalf of the new Congo but Lumumba was
determined to confront the King for his patronizing speech and empower the Congolese
people to see themselves as peers in the world of nations. Lumumba’s unscheduled and
unexpected speech detailed abuses of Belgian colonial administration, insults from
Belgian colonists and spoke to the King of Belgium as a fellow world leader on the same
level as any other nation. Lumumba’s speech was well received by his people but not, as
could be expected, by the Belgians. The speech also served to instill fear in U.S.
policymakers as the first concrete example of Lumumba’s unwillingness to follow the
Western course and maintain the status quo.
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U.S. leadership held a variety of views as to the orientation of Patrice Lumumba.
From communist to opportunity seeker, Lumumba was considered a wild card and could
not be relied upon to act in the best interests of the United States or the West. The Congo
Crisis erupted within days when the Congolese Army, the Armee Nationale Congolaise
(ANC), mutinied over reactions to unfulfilled expectations of independence. This was
followed shortly after by the secession of Katanga and Kasai Provinces. The new
Congolese nation was destabilized completely within days of its independence.
Lumumba traveled throughout the Congo with Kasavubu to quell the unrest and regain
control of the ANC. He was somewhat successful in his objectives because of his
charisma and ability to convince people with his eloquence.
Lumumba’s eloquence and charisma contributed to U.S. distrust of his intentions.
Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles relayed his opinion of Lumumba clearly at a
July 21, 1960 National Security Council Meeting. Citing a CIA study of Lumumba,
Dulles explained that Lumumba was a communist and “another Castro or worse.” He
continued by noting financial support from the Soviet Union through Egyptian leader
Gamel Nasser who the United States treated as a communist. Additionally, Dulles
related strong Leftist and communist trends in Lumumba’s history, Lumumba’s
attendance at a 1959 Communist Youth meeting and promises of financial support from
the Belgian Communist Party. 82 All of this contributed to an attitude that Lumumba was
a threat to U.S. interests in the Cold War.
Dulles’ assessment of Lumumba’s orientation was extreme for the administration.
Others among the cabinet and State Department did not share his assumption that
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Lumumba was an unstable communist. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Henry Cabot
Lodge disagreed with the communist label for Lumumba. Lodge had the occasion to
meet with Lumumba upon his visit to the United States in July 1960 and spoke to him at
length. The report of Lodge’s meeting shows that Lodge believed Lumumba was not a
communist or crazy and that while he demonstrated regular erratic behavior, Lumumba
was intelligent and understood what he wanted and how to get it. 83 If not a communist,
Lumumba’s eloquence, intelligence and fierce nationalism were still viewed as
threatening.
Diplomats working in Leopoldville possible held a deeper perspective on
Lumumba because of their proximity to his governing style and the effects of his
decisions in the Congo. CIA Chief of Station Larry Devlin did not believe Lumumba
was a communist or Soviet agent but feared that continued Soviet manipulation would
cause Lumumba to fall under their control. 84 Robinson McIlvaine was the U.S. Consul
General to Leopoldville during the Congolese transition to independence. He viewed
Patrice Lumumba in a different manner from other policymakers because he experienced
the events on Leopoldville firsthand. His report to Washington on July 26, 1960 relayed
that Lumumba was not a communist but an opportunist. 85 Even if this report alleviated
any fears in the Eisenhower administration that Lumumba was a communist, it would
have instilled a fear of another variety. The Eisenhower administration found relations
with neutral nations difficult; many of these leaders took actions that played one
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superpower on the other in order to gain some advantage for their nation. Being labeled
an opportunist in the second term of the Eisenhower administration could’ve been
considered more dangerous that communist because at least the United States knew
where it stood with communists.
Whether communist or opportunist, Lumumba was disliked by the United States
and U.S. actions and policies reflect this position. The CIA, under Dulles’ personal
direction, instituted an assassination program to eliminate Lumumba after a National
Security Council meeting in late August 1960. 86 While ultimately not directly
responsible for Lumumba’s later execution, the United States supported Joseph Mobutu
and Kasavubu in September 1960 when they worked together to remove Lumumba from
power. Mobutu ruled the Congo until February 1961 through an entity he declared the
college of commissioners. A series of emplaced prime ministers nominally governed the
Congo while the United States, the United Nations and others worked with the Congo to
restore a democratically elected govern to the Congo.
Katangan government officials with the aid of Belgian intelligence advisers killed
Patrice Lumumba on January 17, 1961. His death was reported to the world in February
1961 when the Congolese government announced that Lumumba was shot during an
escape attempt. This story was fabricated to cover up the execution of Lumumba and two
other Congolese leaders but most Congolese, as well as the rest of the world, suspected
foul play. Joseph Kasavubu was implicated in Lumumba’s death and Adlai Stevenson,
the incoming U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations under President Kennedy, assessed
Kasavubu’s role as a source of stability and legality to the Congolese government to be
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damaged. 87 Instability continued and at least three different appointed prime ministers
served the Congo until the election of Cyrille Adoula in August 1961.
Cyrille Adoula was a founding member of Mouvement National Congolais with
Patrice Lumumba. This lineage provided him more legitimacy with the Congolese
people. The return of an elected leader to the Congo restored a certain amount of
stability to the situation in the Congo that pleased the United States and many U.S.
diplomats. U.S. leaders were optimistic about Adoula’s election. After meeting with
Adoula in person, U.S. Ambassador to the Congo Edmund Guillon assured Secretary of
State Dean Rusk that Adoula was the man to contain the flames of civil war and bring
stability to the Congo. Guillon noted Adoula’s strength, calm and goodwill that would
have been refreshing after erratic Lumumba and illegitimate Mobutu governments. 88
Senior leaders in the State Department supported the Ambassador’s opinions of
Adoula. In correspondence to President Kennedy, Undersecretary of State for Economic
Affairs George W. Ball declared that Adoula was “friendly to the United States, respects
our judgment, and has depended on our support.” 89 Adoula’s personality, pro-western
orientation and governance style convinced most in the United States that he was the
Congolese leader to support. However, U.S. leaders were still very weary of the
situation. Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted that Adoula’s government was “basically
pro-western” but worried that the government would fall and be replaced by a “more
radical, leftward-looking regime. The biggest danger Rusk considered when writing to
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his ambassador in the United Kingdom was that a leftist government in Congo would
allow Soviet penetration and western interests in Katanga itself would be in jeopardy. 90
Secretary of State Rusk’s worries about the retention of Katanga in the western
sphere of influence drove policy at this point under Adoula. The U.S. government
desired the reintegration of Katanga into the Congo through peaceful negotiations but
force was not prohibited as a method as will be examined later. The United States
believed Adoula brought enough stability and legitimacy to the Leopoldville government
and could serve the interests of the United States concerning Katanga. Until Adoula’s
election as prime minister, Katanga was governed by Moise Tshombe. Tshombe was the
elected Provincial President at the time of independence but was advised and financially
supported by Belgian government and mining entities.
The general feeling of U.S. sentiment toward Tshombe was of a negative tone.
Tshombe essentially caused the Congo Crisis by seceding from the central government of
the Congo and declaring Katangan independence in July 1960. Additionally, it was in
Katanga that Lumumba was executed after being delivered there by complicit
Leopoldville government leaders. In February 1961, Ambassador Stevenson explicitly
named Tshombe as “ the most serious problem in current circumstances” in his
correspondence with the Secretary of State. 91 This assessment of Tshombe continued
with U.S. diplomats under the Adoula government. Undersecretary of State Ball agreed
in September 1961 that Tshombe was “the basic problem” and supported the buildup of
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U.N. power to persuade Tshombe to quit secession and rejoin the Congo. 92 Ambassador
Guillon spoke with Adoula in September 1961 to assure him of U.S. support for his
government and the peaceful reintegration of Katanga. Guillon told Adoula that
Congolese unity through negotiations was U.S. policy but it did not mean the United
States was “committed to or wanted to save the skin of Mr. Tshombe.” 93
Tshombe found himself on the bad side of U.S. leadership as long as he continued
to lead Katanga as a secessionist state. After the reunification of Katanga into the Congo,
Tshombe was not as threatening because Katanga was under the protection of the
western-oriented Adoula government. After this phase of the crisis subsided, Tshombe
was not the center of attention until his election as prime minister of the Congo. This
unusual rise to power of the nation from which he seceded can be linked to the greatest
threat faced by the Congo at the time of his tenure.
Lumumba’s home province Orientale in north-central Congo remained a bastion
of opposition to the Congolese government for the duration of the Crisis. In the summer
of 1964 as Tshombe was being elected to prime minister, rebellion broke out led by
leftists, named the Simbas, from Orientale Province. Probably based on his close ties to
Belgian mining companies as well as his stalwart earlier secession to protect their
interests in Katanga, Tshombe held reliable anti-communist credentials. It was these
credentials that made him attractive to the United States.
Tshombe allowed U.S. transport planes to drop Belgian paratroopers into
Stanleyville, the capital of Orientale Province, to rescue European hostages taken by
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Simba rebels. Soon after Tshombe hired British white mercenary Mike Hoare to raise a
mercenary army of predominant South Africans to defeat the Simba rebellion. The
introduction of white soldiers and mercenaries to fight Congolese threats was not popular
in the Congo but was seen as necessary by the United States and its allies to secure their
interests and defeat communism. Assistance from Che Guevara and Cuba did not make
the Simbas successful against Hoare’s CIA-supported mercenary forces and their threat
ended in late 1965. Having served his usefulness to the United States and with the threat
of communism greatly reduced Tshombe was dismissed by President Kasavubu and fled
the Congo under charges of treason.
Soon after Joseph Mobutu overthrew Kasavubu and Tshombe’s replacement as
prime minister. At this point, Joseph Mobutu was in charge of the Congo for the second
time in five years and would remain for another twenty-nine years until the mid 1990s.
Despite CIA Congo Chief of Station Larry Devlin’s denial of involvement in Mobutu’s
second coup, Mobutu’s leadership and reliability was not necessarily counter to U.S.
interests in stability of the Congo. Mobutu had proven to be a reliable ally against
communism. Devlin had given U.S. assurance and financial support to Mobutu’s plans
for his first coup that resulted in the expulsion of all Soviet, Chinese and Czech
technicians and advisers from the Congo. 94
The procession of Congolese prime ministers follows the level of political
instability found in the Congo during the Crisis. Within five years, three prime ministers
were democratically elected, one was executed, one exiled and the government was
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overthrown by the military twice. The U.S. interests in protecting Katangan minerals and
territory from the influence of expanding communism were furthered by the series of
leaders in the Congo.
The United States disliked and distrusted Lumumba and made plans to assassinate
him or support his removal. Through the CIA, the United States was able to gain
Lumumba’s removal from office in addition to the expulsion of communist advisers with
Mobutu’s first coup. With Lumumba out of power, Katanga was protected with the
removal of the most direct threat of communist introduction to the Congo. Under
Mobutu’s control throughout the rest of 1960 and the first half of 1961, the Congo
worked toward a negotiated political settlement to restore a legitimate system of
government. During this period the United States did not press Tshombe and Katanga to
rejoin the Congo; the lack of a legitimate and reliable leader elected in the Congo meant
the United States had to maintain the ability to support Katangan secession in case of the
return of a leftist leader.
Cyrille Adoula served the role of a legitimately elected and dependable ally.
Most senior U.S. diplomats and leaders viewed Adoula to be a source of strength and
calm that could stabilize the situation in the Congo and stop the internal chaos. Despite
this confidence in Adoula’s leadership, the reality of the Congolese political system did
not allow the United States to fully support Katanga reunification with the Congo.
Instead the United States bought time for further stabilization of the political situation by
calling for a peaceful reintegration completed through negotiations. Once the possibility
of stabilization was severely threatened by U.N. failures, the United States began to
overtly support U.N. operations designed to expel Belgian mercenaries and advisers from
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Katanga and force its reintegration. Tshombe was assessed to be the biggest problem for
the Congo after Adoula’s election until Katanga ceased its secession. However, Tshombe
was used as a steadfast anti-communist ally when the United States needed the threat of
leftist rebellion removed. If a leftist government took over the Congo, Katanga would be
threatened by the eventual introduction of communist advisers and technicians to the
Congo. Once the communist threat was destroyed with the defeat of the Simba rebellion,
the United States did not need Tshombe anymore. This is why no serious objections by
the United States to Mobutu’s second coup occurred; Mobutu had already served
consistently as an anti-communist ally of the United States. Additionally, Mobutu had
previously received money from the United States and therefore presented the United
States with a solid ally that possessed an ability to be pressured to cooperate because of
his previous collaboration with the United States.

With Mobutu in authoritarian power,

the threat of communists gaining access to the minerals and territory of Katanga was all
but removed.
The United Nations as an Instrument of U.S. Policy
Determination of U.S. policy in the Congo Crisis through examination of U.S.
leaders’ views of the leaders of the Congo is a prime example of the Great Man method
of historical analysis. With this examination follow some of the weaknesses of Great
Man history. By themselves, the views of U.S. policymakers do not constitute proof that
the United States acted to protect its national security interests by ensuring protection of
Katanga Province from communists. However, when this analysis is combined with the
actions of the United Nations and its operations against Katanga, it becomes clear that the
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United States used the United Nations to further its interests based on its interpretations
of Congolese leaders’ trustworthiness.
The United Nations was formed at the end of World War II as the descendent of
the League of Nations. Its charter proscribed self-determination and the resolution of
international conflict through debate and negotiations. The organization was created with
the intention to make conventional warfare obsolete. Fifty-one nations signed the United
Nations charter at the outset of the organization; the nature of the organization provides
the impression that it is a form of international democracy in which the world’s nations
participate in equally. By the time of Congolese independence the United Nations was
composed of nearly one hundred nations with the beginning of blocs of nations that
formed based on common interests.
Soon after the Congo Crisis began, Lumumba and Kasavubu requested U.N.
intervention to restore order and stability to the Congo. This was done, partly, to avoid
the introduction of the Soviet Union or the United States in a unilateral manner. U.N.
support and intervention in the Congo aligned with Eisenhower’s desire to minimize the
amount of opportunities the Soviet Union would have to damage U.S. credibility with
and gain influence in the newly decolonizing nations in Africa. Indeed, U.S. Ambassador
to the Congo Claire Timberlake recommended the idea of U.N. intervention to both
Kasavubu and Lumumba and viewed this option as a way to “keep bears out of the
Congo caviar.” 95
As an international organization with nearly one hundred member nations by
1960, the United Nations was designed to be a body that could ensure collective security.
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The U.N. General Assembly allows one vote per nation and the Security Council allows
any resolution to be vetoed by one of five permanent members. By its construction, the
United Nations should be an independent organization that acts in order to preserve the
interests of as many nations as possible. In order to view the U.N. actions in the Congo
Crisis as protecting and furthering U.S. interests, the independence of the United Nations
must be disproven.
The scholars that argue a neocolonial motivation of U.S. policy on the Congo
Crisis see the United Nations as the action arm of U.S. policy. Ludo DeWitte generally
portrays the United Nations doing the work of the United States while David N. Gibbs
argues that at times U.N. policy in the Congo was exactly the same as the U.S. policy. 96
Even some proponents of national security motivations presume the United Nations
represented U.S. interests in the Congo. Stephen Weissman contends that it was
satisfactory in mid-1960 to consider the United Nations a vehicle for American policy.
He supports this position with analysis of the U.N. Secretariat; Hammarskjold’s closest
advisers were American. Additionally, American, British or French diplomats filled 49
out of 102 senior positions in the Secretariat. 97 It is presumed in this paper that the
United Nations, while not always completely aligned with U.S. policies and interests,
acted against Katanga only when the United States allowed it to do so.
The United Nations entered the Congo as a result of its invitation from Kasavubu
and Lumumba as well as a U.N. Resolution authorizing intervention. United Nations
Resolution 143 was approved July 14, 1960 and authorized the Secretary General to give
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whatever military assistance he deemed necessary to the government of the Congo. It
also called for the withdrawal of the Belgian troops remaining in the Congo from the preindependence period and those deployed to the Congo after the mutiny of the Congolese
Army. The United States voted for this resolution and viewed it as aligned with its
interests of restoring order and stability to the Congo and preventing the unilateral entry
of Soviet bloc forces.
The Katanga secession was a grave issue for the government of the Congo.
Lumumba was adamant that the United Nations use its military to forcefully reintegrate
Katanga into the Congo. Secretary General Hammarskjold refused arguing Resolution
143 did not give him authority to have the U.N. forces (UNFOR) enter Katanga Province.
In early August, the Security Council approved Resolution 146, supported by a U.S. vote,
which explicitly gave the Secretary General authority to order UNFOR into the province
of Katanga. This resolution repeated the calls for the withdrawal of all Belgian troops
from the Congo and especially Katanga. Despite this authority, Hammarskjold did not
use UNFOR to remove Belgian troops because Resolution 146 also forbade UNFOR
from intervening in the internal conflict of the Congo. At this point the United Nations
had solidified its intervention into the Congo Crisis but prevented any forceful
reintegration of Katanga. Hammarskjold’s refusal to intervene in Katanga protected U.S.
interests in Katanga from unreliable Lumumba.
The death of Lumumba in early 1961 altered the entire situation in the Congo.
The United States and Belgium were publicly believed responsible for Lumumba’s
demise. Lumumba was killed on January 17, 1961 with two companions. They were
executed by firing squad in the jungle of Katanga Province by Katangan government
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officials with the assistance and acknowledgement of Belgian intelligence services. The
events of Lumumba’s death were not known at the time; Katanga released statements a
month later relating that Lumumba and his partners were shot during an escape attempt
and their bodies were turned over to local tribes for burial. The obvious cover-up
infuriated many across the world. Hammarskjold realized a harsher course needed to be
taken to end the secession of Katanga and thus the Congo Crisis.
It was at this time that Kasavubu ended the military rule of Mobutu and installed
Joseph Ileo as prime minister. Additionally, the United Nations Security Council passed
a resolution denouncing Lumumba’s death, calling for an independent investigation into
the death and authorizing U.N. actions to prevent civil war in the Congo. After six
months of little to no action the United Nations launched, with approval of newly elected
Adoula, its first operation to forcefully remove Belgians and mercenaries from Katanga.
Operation Rumpunch was executed by the U.N. commander in Katanga on August 28,
1961 and lasted throughout the day until arrests of mercenaries and Belgian military
officers was halted by the pleas of the Belgian consul in Katanga. The operation was
launched without prior U.S. knowledge and did not fit with U.S. objectives of
reintegrating Katanga through peaceful means. If the U.N. operation was successful and
Tshombe and his government were removed through force, a power vacuum would be
opened and the United States feared leftists within Katanga and the Congo would fill it. 98
U.S. interests would be protected only with Tshombe and his anti-communist government
left in place of a reintegrated Katanga Province.
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The United Nations launched a second operation in early September to expel
mercenaries from Katanga and return that province to the central government of the
Congo. The United States was still not supportive of this action because it desired a
peaceful resolution that would prevent a possible power vacuum in Katanga being filled
with communists. U.S. objection to this operation proved justified; Operation Morthor
developed into a debacle due to lack of tactical surprise, fierce resistance by Katanga
military units and disjointed U.N. leadership. The United States was in tough position;
Katanga was protecting itself against actions the United States believed could lead to a
communist takeover. However, the Katanga military was defeating the United Nations,
the organization that gave credibility to Western objectives and policies in the Third
World. These concerns led to U.S. calls for a ceasefire; some argue this pressure
motivated Hammarskjold to fly to Northern Rhodesia to negotiate a settlement with
Tshombe in exile. This trip ended prematurely with the crash of Hammarskjold’s plane
and his death.
The situation in the Congo had degraded into armed action between the United
Nations and secessionist Katangan forces. The battles between these forces were
generally unsuccessful because they countered U.S. policy of negotiating reintegration of
a Tshombe-led Katanga. The battles also endangered the goal of retaining a friendly
government in Leopoldville. Leftists in the Congolese government were agitating against
Adoula; his inability to achieve the reintegration of Katanga was weakening his political
position within the Congo because he appeared to be an instrument of Belgian policies.
After the U.N. defeat in Operation Morthor and the death of relatively moderate
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Hammarskjold the United States saw increased danger of a communist takeover of the
Congo. This led to a harsher approach by the United States toward Katanga.
The failures of the United Nations emboldened Tshombe’s resistance to
negotiations with Leopoldville. The worsened situation caused by the failed U.N.
operations increased the willingness of the United States to pursue a harsher course to
reintegrate Katanga. The United States supported Operation UNOKAT as a method to
force Tshombe to the negotiating table because it feared Adoula’s ouster or turn to nonwestern assistance to defeat Katanga. 99 The United Nations under its new Secretary
General, U Thant, used attacks against U.N. personnel in Katanga as a pretext for the
next military operation against Katanga. In December 1961, UNFOR was successful in
expelling mercenaries and taking control of Elisabethville. United States interests were
achieved on December 21, 1961 when Tshombe met with Adoula and agreed to talks
designed to end secession and rejoin the Congo. 100
Tshombe was known for his duplicitous negotiation style. Repeated promises
made to ease tensions and secure his interests were broken at the first opportunity by
Tshombe. Operation UNOKAT ended with Tshombe’s agreement to negotiations
designed to end the secession but Tshombe stalled the productivity of these talks for
almost a year. During this time, Tshombe continued to build his military and air power
and became increasingly belligerent toward UNFOR. By December 1962, the United
Nations was finished with Tshombe’s actions and launched Operation Grand Slam after
Katangan forces attacked U.N. aviation. Operation Grand Slam was executed with
increased force and some U.S. coordination; it resulted in decisive defeat of Katangan
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forces. On January 15, 1963 Tshombe formally renounced secession and the Congo
Crisis ended. The United States publicly protested this U.N. action along with its
European allies to show appreciation for their support of the United States during the
recent Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite this public protest, the United States secured its
primary interest of reintegrating Katanga securely into a friendly Congolese government.
The Katangan Secession served as the primary threat to U.S. interests during the
Congo Crisis. The objective of U.S. policy from the time of secession shortly after
Congolese independence until Tshombe’s capitulation in late 1962 was the protection of
the minerals and lines of communication that lay inside the province. The United States
did not always agree with U.N. actions, such as Operation Rumpunch, but retained the
ability to influence the outcome of those actions. Ultimately, the United States was able
to use the United Nations as the instrument to achieve its goal of prevention of
communist influence over Katanga. The United Nations provided the United States with
a multilateral and essentially credible device to achieves its aims.
As shown in this chapter, the United States was actively involved in the Congo
Crisis. Once the illusion of complete U.N. independence from the United States is
removed, it is clear that the United States was a key player in the Congo Crisis and was
the victor in the issue of Katanga. Katanga possessed the ingredients that composed its
value to U.S. interests: minerals and geostrategic location. Leadership within the Congo
was integral to the level of perceived threat to the province and the United States based
its actions and decisions concerning the Katangan Secession on its assessment of these
leaders.
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U.S. policymakers probably misunderstood Patrice Lumumba. That Lumumba
was viewed as a threat to the stability of the Congo as well as the protection of Katanga
from communist influence lent to his demise. The United States did not support
Lumumba and even launched a plot to assassinate him. A Lumumba government of the
Congo prevented Katanga from reunification. Katanga outside of a stable, pro-western
Congo increased the threat of communist exploitation of the instability it created. The
goal of the United States was protection of Katanga for its national security value. U.S.
pseudocolonial actions to remove Lumumba from power can be understood as actions
taken to secure its national security interests.
Once removed from power by Mobutu’s first coup, Lumumba remained a threat.
While alive, the possibility of Lumumba’s return to power was great due to his charisma
and eloquent speech. His political ability to gain agreement and acquiescence of his
opponents with his speech was dangerous to U.S. interests. Lumumba’s death removed
this threat but the instability caused by the suspicion and cover-up surrounding his death
made any U.S. moves to reintegrate Katanga at this point wishful thinking. The United
States worked with its partners and the United Nations to return a legitimate government
to the Congo and was successful with Cyrille Adoula’s election by parliament as prime
minister. U.S. leaders liked Adoula and believed him to be a friendly, strong and reliable
partner.
Their affinity for Adoula aside, U.S. leaders were hesitant to support U.N.
operation to forcefully restore Katanga to the Congo after Adoula’s election. The United
States pushed for peaceful reintegration of Katanga through negotiations and used this
position to argue against both U.N. Operations Rumpunch and Morthor in August and
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September of 1961. However, the U.S. hand was forced after the instability created by
Hammarskjold’s death and the U.N. defeat in Operation Morthor in September 1961.
Adoula faced the threat of overthrow due to his inability to achieve Katangan
reintegration; his removal would provide a power vacuum for communist forces to fill.
Once communists were in power in the Congo, external support from the Soviet bloc
would ensure the end of the Katangan Secession and bring that province under
communist control. The United States changed its approach in response to this threat and
supported U.N. Operation UNOKAT in December 1961 that forced Tshombe to the
negotiating table.
The threat of communism to Katanga was not removed by this U.N. victory.
Tshombe delayed and distracted the negotiations for almost an entire year while he built
up his military power to increase his ability to defend his secession. With the pretext of
Katangan aggression against U.N. aircraft the United Nations launched Operation Grand
Slam in December 1962. This U.N. victory proved decisive and forced Tshombe to
capitulate and end the secession. The end of the secession and the return of Katanga to
the Congo under Adoula’s government achieved the U.S. goal of protecting Katanga
against communist control.
The Congo remained united under Adoula’s government and faced internal threats
from communist forces based in Orientale Province and elsewhere. The United States
required the defeat of this communist insurgency in order to protect Katanga. Once
again, the threat of communist takeover of the central Congolese government meant the
takeover of Katanga. To destroy this threat the United States supported the election of
Moise Tshombe as Congolese prime minister. With proven anti-communist credentials,
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Tshombe gave the United States a reliable ally that allowed Belgian, French and U.S.
intervention to defeat the communist insurgency.
Tshombe’s usefulness to the United States passed with the removal of the
communist threat to the Congolese government. The United States received an enormous
benefit when Joseph Mobutu launched his second coup in five years and took control of
the Congolese government. This time Mobutu did not intend to return control to a
civilian government. He took measures to rid the Congo of democratic processes and
installed himself as the leader of the Congo; his reign as autocrat lasted until the early
1990s. While Mobutu did not always make the United States happy, he served the rest of
the cold war as protector of Katanga against communist influence. The United States
supported his regime through loans, gifts and even the informal support of retired CIA
Station Chief Larry Devlin’s service as an adviser to Mobutu in the 1970s. Mobutu’s
second coup and long reign symbolize U.S. comfort with pseudocolonialism in the
Congo.
The pseudocolonial actions of the United States throughout the Congo Crisis are
result of its national security interests. The Congo’s main value to the United States was
Katanga. Katanga was valuable for its possession of cobalt and railways that allowed
movement across Africa. Because Katanga could not survive as an independent nation it
needed to be reintegrated. Reintegration only occurred with U.S. support; this support
only came when the United States viewed the Congolese government strong enough to
protect Katanga from communist influence. Leadership changes in the Congo after the
Congo Crisis occurred as needed to defend against communist penetration and expansion
into the Congo. U.S. policy in the Congo Crisis focused on the installation of a friendly
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government to protect its national security interests; these actions are the definition of
pseudocolonialism.

83

Chapter Six: Conclusion
The global competition between superpowers during the Cold War is classified in
varying degrees as a forty-five year battle. It was a battle of competing ideologies; it was
a battle of competing economic interests. The Cold War has been viewed as a struggle
between the forces of good and evil. The United States and the Soviet Union acted to
secure their way of life and security. Skeptics argue a less altruistic motivation existed in
the Third World. The Cold War constructed a world order that was bi-polar; this
construction began as the pre-WWII colonial order was disintegrating. In the midst of
this turmoil the Congo found itself in the middle of the battle fought between
superpowers in the opening decades of the Cold War.
Scholars who study the Congo Crisis used the sources available to develop a
continuing argument over motivations behind U.S. intervention into the affairs of
independent Congo. The United States acted both unilaterally and through the United
Nations to gain a friendly and stable Congo without Soviet or communist influence. It is
simple to understand a nation acts to secure it interests; pseudocolonialism helped the
United States achieve this goal in the Congo.
Those who believe national security drove U.S. policy and those who believe
neocolonialism was the catalyst set the historiographical field of the Congo Crisis. The
terms used to define U.S. motivations are rarely defined in the literature; this may be due
in the large variance between multiple definitions of each term. Public and scholarly
discourse alters the definitions over time. The United States views national security
interests to include fostering economic well being as well as maintaining the order
required to protect the vital interests of the United States and its friends. Neocolonialism
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is a policy that has the objective of influencing other nations to achieve national
economic interests. By these definition neocolonialism is a method to achieve a viable
national security interest: economic well being. However, because neocolonialism is
used only to describe selfish greed at the expense of others it does not properly describe
U.S. actions in the Congo. A new term, pseudocolonialism, must be introduced to
appropriately classify U.S. actions. The United States established a pseudocolonial
Congolese regime, one friendly to the United States and unfriendly to the Soviet Union,
in order to protect its national security interests. This pseudocolonial regime maintained
the stability required to protect Katangan minerals and infrastructure vital to U.S. national
security.
Stability of the Congo was in the interest of the United States at the time of the
Congo Crisis because of the ongoing Cold War. Without the Cold War, the Congo Crisis
would undoubtedly have progressed differently. But the Cold War was raging at the time
and the new nations in Africa participated in the conflict in one manner or another.
Whether willingly or not, the Congo was subject to the power of the two most influential
nations in the world at the time of their independence. U.S. policy was reactive in the
Congo because of delinquent focus on Africa. It was only in 1957 that a Bureau of
African Affairs was formed at the State Department. Lack of U.S. attention toward
Africa led to its inability to forecast crises there. Crises in Africa usually occurred to the
surprise of the United States forcing U.S. policy to be reactive. The Congo found itself
absorbed in the middle of the Cold War battle over influence, resources and strategy as
superpowers reacted to perceived threats.
To maintain national security, the United States needed to be successful in its
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publicly stated strategy of containing communism within its current borders. In the
fifteen years following WWII, Eastern Europe was controlled by the Soviets and the
Chinese Communists controlled the largest national population in the world.
Governments across the world took actions that caused U.S. intervention to stop what
was believed to be the spread of communism. One of the most significant losses of
territory to communist influence was Cuba because of its proximity to the borders of the
United States. Castro’s takeover of Cuba wounded U.S. prestige across the world. The
United States needed to avoid the loss of any more nations especially one as strategically
important as the Congo.
Intangible concepts such as prestige and image are hard to explain. A highly
industrialized nation’s requirements for vast amounts of material to feed its development
and production are not as difficult to understand. The United States required large
amounts of specific materials and minerals for the health of its economy and, most
importantly, its defense. U.S. requirements for listed strategic and critical materials in
the case of war represented a national security interest and led to many agreements over
time. These materials affected U.S. actions toward the Congo throughout its long
relationship; the Congo Crisis presented no alteration to this arrangement. Prior to the
Crisis, the United States took the necessary steps to ensure their access to uranium. But
once Congolese uranium was no longer pertinent the United States acted to control access
to the largest cobalt reserve on the world. The national security of the United States
depended on the guaranteeing U.S. access and denying Soviet access to strategic
materials.
Containing communism was a policy chosen in order to avoid direct confrontation
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with the Soviet Union at the end of WWII. After both superpowers were armed with
atomic weaponry, the tension between the two nations solidified into a stalemate.
Extension of their influence and preventing the spread of their enemy’s influence were
objectives of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Because policies like NSC-68,
“zero-sum” and the domino theory attached strategic value to every location on earth, the
United States had to address crises everywhere in their goal of containing communism.
Despite inflated values placed on other nations by the United States, the Congo possessed
actual strategic value. While U.S. intervention in the Congo was informed by the policies
of inflated value, U.S. national security was related to the minerals and infrastructure that
lay within Congolese borders.
If the Congo turned toward the communist world, the balance of power could be
negatively affected for the United States and it could see two national security interests
endangered. If power became unbalanced the threat of WWIII became more relevant.
U.S. policymakers needed to prepare for that imbalance by protecting strategically
valuable locations and infrastructure. A communist Congo could be the launching point
for communism to spread into North Africa that could eventually lead to the loss of U.S.
access to the Suez Canal. Additionally, if the sea lines of communication in the
Mediterranean Sea and the waters off South Africa were threatened, the United States
would require land and air routes across Africa to move troops and equipment to the
Middle East. The United States had access to bases in North Africa and Ethiopia for
staging troops but U.S. military forces would need railways running through the Congo to
move across southern Africa.
Scholars have debated the motivations of foreign power intervention in the Congo
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since it began. The major debate between national security interests and neocolonialism
separates the authors who analyze the Congo Crisis. The Congo possesses some of the
world’s highest quality minerals in amounts that outmatch most other nations’ reserves.
This great mineral wealth provides easy material to support the neocolonial argument that
the United States acted only to secure profits. Indeed, there is great profit to be made by
securing rights and access to these materials. However, profit is not the only U.S.
motivation just because the Congo is unmatched in mineral wealth. Indeed, if profits
were the primary objective they were not served by Union Miniere’s retention of the
mining industries in Katanga at the end of the Crisis.
In the years leading to the Congo Crisis tensions were elevated and peace between
the two nuclear-armed superpowers was anything but secure. The Congo Crisis took its
place in a string of continuous crises affecting the international balance of power in the
early 1960s. Congolese possession of the largest reserves of materials required by any
industrialized nation made it almost inevitable that the two largest powers in the world
would attempt to gain influence over the Congo. In the superpower struggle to secure
advantage over their opponent, the Congo played the role of a nation literally caught in
the middle. Its location on the map ensured it would be affected by the conflict between
superpowers. The United States was in a better position at the outset of the Congo Crisis
because it already possessed access to a friendly Congo; when that situation seemed
endangered the United States operated to secure its national security interests by
establishing a pseudocolonial regime in the form of Joseph Mobutu’s dictatorship that
lasted for almost thirty years.
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